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Abstract 
Social cash transfer programmes on the African continent have more than doubled in the 
last decade, and this signifies a transformation in the perception of social cash transfers as ‘pity 
handouts’ to how they are seen today, as ‘productive investments’ in human capabilities. 
Southern Africa has been a pioneer in social protection growth in the last twenty years, but often 
accounts of these histories focus on pension schemes in places such as South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana, and Lesotho. There is little incorporation of Mozambique’s social protection history, 
and most histories do not detail that Mozambique ranks fourth chronologically, in introduction 
of cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. This research puts forth that the 
Mozambican case of an early adoption of cash transfers in 1990 is a positive and unique example 
of a state’s active role in social protection despite neoliberal constraints. The state-led adoption 
of cash transfers in response to rising inequality and economic instability is unexpected at a time 
when these programmes were unpopular development interventions and when the state was 
supposedly rolled-back and confined because neoliberalism and the civil war. Tracing the history 
of Mozambican social cash transfers in the last 25 years illustrates two consistencies of the 
Mozambican government: 1. A supportive political position towards state involvement in welfa re 
programmes, despite the government’s own political and development sector transformation 
from Marxist-Leninist orientation to welcoming of privatization; and 2. State financial and 
political support of social protection throughout a period when cash transfers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa went from unpopular hand-out interventions during crises, to lobbying for permanent 
social protection as a mechanism to address chronic poverty. 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
1.i. Background 
With regards to the environment of Mozambique in the midst his presidency, Joachim 
Chissano once exasperated, “I can’t do anything, because we are inside this ma chine of the 
World Bank” (Hanlon 1996). Known as a ‘development darling’ and privatization ‘success story’ 
in Africa because of its adoption of neoliberal practices, post-civil war Mozambique presents an 
interesting landscape to explore common conceptions of the role of the state under the confines 
of neoliberalism (Hanlon 2004; Hanlon and Smart 2008; Pitcher 2002). Neoliberalism is 
associated with a critique of state involvement in economic activity as inefficient or promoting 
corruption (Ferguson 2015; Mkandawire 2001; Mkandawire 2010; Oya 2009; Weiss 2010). On 
policies related to growth and poverty reduction in the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberal ideology 
tended to advocate for a limited role of state institutions and roles in social services, namely the 
provision of welfare, health and education. In part, this explains the vast number of non-
governmental organizations carrying out social services and development work across the 
continent over this period (Ferguson 2006; Mkandawire 2010). While states such as 
Mozambique were perceived to be ‘rolled back’ when they accepted the conditions put in place 
to receive World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) support, there is evidence of 
the Mozambican state simultaneously implementing their own welfare and social services, such 
as social cash transfers, despite neoliberal disinclination towards these state practices. The social  
protection programmes that were initiated in this period of neoliberalism’s greatest influence 
have come to be seen as part of a wave of new welfare provisions across the global South, which 
some scholars see as signs of a post-neoliberal era (Harris and Scully 2015). Therefore, what does 
it mean to observe the Mozambican state in the 1990’s neoliberal era adopting and growing 
social cash transfer programmes, at a time unlikely for government-funded social cash transfer 
programmes? What does this additionally say about conceptions of state autonomy under the 
confines of neoliberalism? 
State autonomy is the concept of the state having jurisdiction and authority over its 
economic, political and social affairs, independent from external actors (Evans 1995).  State 
autonomy is often implied to be at odds with ‘anti-statist’ neoliberalism, and this creates a 
vacuum of discussion on what state autonomy has looked like under neoliberal influence, 
especially in the sphere of social services (Ferguson 2009; Mkandawire 2001). Scholars of recent, 
however, have pointed out that the role of the state has remained and been highly instrumental 
in creating the institutional atmosphere for economic liberalization during the neoliberal era of 
the 1970s to 1990s, despite ideas that the state was rolled-back in favour of free-market reforms 
(De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Ferguson 2009; Jinadu 2010; Mkandawire 2001; Pitcher 2002; 
Weiss 2010). Evans (1995) supports this further when stating that the ‘zenith’ of attacking the 
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role of the state during neoliberalism has passed, because involvement of the state under 
neoliberalism is a given. The question today, therefore, should not be about ‘how much’ states 
have been involved, but ‘what kind’ of involvement and autonomy. In addition, while literature 
on the state’s role under neoliberalism does exist, scholars tend to focus on the extent of the 
state’s role in economic activity, not social action or social services, which also took a hit because 
of neoliberal ideology. One particular social service, social protection, weakly emphasizes the 
role of the state in initiating these programmes in low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Research Question: 
What does the history of social cash transfer programmes in Mozambique tell us about 
the role of state within the confines of neoliberalism and civil war? How does this history of 
social cash transfer programmes relate to the common association of such programmes in Africa 
with the post 2000s focus on social protection from international financial institutions? 
The utilization of social cash transfers as a measurement of the role of the state under 
neoliberal constraints is a response to neoliberalism’s attempt to remove the state’s role in 
social services. In practice, this privatization of development work has led to donors tending to 
overly influence and fund development agendas (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Hanlon 2008; 
Ferguson 2006; Ferguson 2015; Marshall 1990). Despite being a ‘development darling’, 
Mozambique started the first cash transfer programme of a low-income country on the 
continent, and it was initiated completely by the state without funding from external donors 
until after 2006 (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015; Massingharela and Nhate 2006).  
1.ii. Literature Review 
This literature review traces academic debates on the rise of social protection and social 
cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, in order to present common rationales for the origins, 
growth, and challenges of social cash transfers over the last few decades. In addition, this section 
also presents scholarly discussions on the role of the state under neoliberal confines. If the 
dynamics of Mozambique’s first social cash transfer are unique from the more common 
Southern African pension schemes, what can Mozambique’s case say about how the state works 
and state autonomy despite restrictive external influence? In order to contribute to debates on 
social cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is imperative to go back to their origins and 
understand the conditions under which social cash transfer programmes normally come about 
and the rationales behind them. Thus, this literature review also covers discussions on the roles 
of conflict, neoliberalism and structural adjustment in social protection development, as these 
conditions were present when Mozambique’s first cash transfer programme started. These 
debates are brought forth here to support the argument that the Mozambican case of cash 
transfers offers evidence of state autonomy to act over social protection despite neoliberal 
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attempts to remove this role, and an exceptionally early case of state-sponsored cash transfer 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
1.ii.a. Social protection and the rise of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Social protection and cash transfer programmes have been on the rise on development 
agendas in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last two decades. The reasons for this growth range from 
their recognition as low-cost mechanisms to assist against environmental and economic 
catastrophe shocks, vulnerability due to sustained chronic poverty, and due to urbanisation and 
industrialization (Devereux 2013; Ellis, Devereux and White 2009, p.3; Garcia and Moore 2012; 
Lavers and Hickey 2015; Midgley 2013). Social protection programmes are implemented to 
improve social inclusion and political stability through, in addition to cash, provision of housing 
and adequate nutrition, and ensuring access to education and healthcare (Omilola and Kaniki 
2014, p. 2). Debates on the purpose of social protection range from poverty reduction to 
emphasis on social solidarity, equality and promotion of social rights (Midgley 2013, p. 7-8). 
What most of these ‘classifications’ of social protection purpose fail to cover is that social 
protection programmes evolve over time, and do not need to be perpetually stuck within one 
type of focus or purpose.  
A turn towards social protection mainstreaming has been cited as a move towards 
‘predictable funding for predictable needs’, which is different from typical emergency and food 
insecurity interventions such as food aid and food subsidies (De Rooij 2015). These programmes 
emphasize seasonal deprivation and short-term relief during vulnerable times, and had been the 
main form of poverty relief in Sub-Saharan Africa for decades after independence of most 
countries (Devereux 2013; Ellis, Devereux and White 2009, p. 3-4; Ellis 2012; Garcia and Moore 
2012, p. 2, 36). There are several positions regarding the rise of social protection in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as influence from European welfare programmes or Latin American economic cr isis 
responses; social protection as a tool for economic growth; and lastly the political motivation to 
increase social stability and gain political support for an elite group or the state (Lavers and 
Hickey 2015). These rationales will be discussed in the successive sections. 
Influence of Europe and Latin America 
For decades, social policy has been the foundation of European welfare states to 
establish political settlements by democratic classes (Midgley 2013).  Redistributive social 
protection was demanded by trade unions, the working classes and at times rural populations. 
These demands resulted in a political settlement between labor and the state, using social 
protection policy to bring stability and capitalist development to post-World War II Europe 
(Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 8). Some scholars such as Devereux (2002; 2013, p. 13) and Midgley 
(2013) argue that mid-20th century welfare policy in Africa, for small wage-earning urban 
populations, was largely modeled after European programmes. Therefore, early African social 
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protection programmes were not indigenous. European models did not map well on the African 
context, however, and adoptions from the North failed to consider the economic and social 
structures of African countries. The setback of European models led to longer term inefficiencies 
and failure to meet local needs through social protection. Whereby in Europe, the number of 
people living in poverty without access to regular paid work is a minority, the reverse is the case 
in Africa (Devereux 2013). While the South African cash transfer has roots stemming from 
European pension schemes and could have influenced the growth of other similar programmes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is titled ‘exceptional’ for the region because South Africa has historical ly 
been a wealthier country that has evidence of relevance to European models of development 
(Devereux 2002; Devereux 2013, p. 18; Seekings 2009 cited in Lavers and Hickey 2015). 
Despite the links between Europe and its colonial states, there were limited examples of 
social protection for wider African populations during colonization.  It is worth acknowledging, 
however, that there were scattered examples of social services for exclusive groups of colonial 
civil servants in places such as Mozambique (Kaleidoscopio 2015). As mentioned above, not all 
Sub-Saharan Africa programmes were linked to or modeled from European programmes, and 
the contextual failures of the European modeled programmes in Africa created a detachment 
from European models, seen in the more contemporary, indigenous African programmes.  While 
the next section will portray how some Sub-Saharan African programmes similarly were 
employed for political settlement purposes, as with the trend in European programmes, there is 
one direct link between European and contemporary African programmes. This is stated clearly 
by Mkandawire (2010), when arguing that the spread of social policy and welfare in Sub-Saharan 
Africa was a result of the backlash against extractive and discriminatory practices of colonial 
authorities. This linkage has metaphorical value in the rise of cash transfers in response to 
neoliberal economic policies of the 1980ss. 
The rise in contemporary social protection was ushered in by the implementation of 
conditional cash transfers in Brazil and other Latin American countries; the expansion and 
redesign of social assistance in South Africa; and the creation of pension schemes in other 
Southern African countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia (Ferguson 2015; Midgley 
2013). From the successes seen in Latin America with conditional cash transfer programmes, 
some argue that these programmes influenced the growth in social cash transfers in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Barrientos 2011; Ellis 2012; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010; Lavinas 2013). 
In contrast to Europe, the socio-economic (non-wage earning) demographics, in addition to 
political atmospheres, of Latin American countries resonate with African countries more closely. 
In both cases in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America, social protection and social cash 
transfers came in as a response to economic crises of the 1980s, in which poverty and inequal ity 
grew as a result of economic instability and the detriment of structural adjustment programmes 
(SAPs) (Garcia and Moore 2012; Lavinas 2013; Mkandawire 2010). Specifically, in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa, since the 1980s and even before, there has been intense strain on poor and vulnerable 
populations despite levels of aid and development assistance interventions. In addition, the 
threat of the 2008 global financial crisis and food shortages has exacerbated levels of chronic 
poverty, resulting in greater donor interest in mitigating the effects of rising food and fuel pr ices 
for vulnerable groups (Garcia and Moore 2012; Standing 2008). The same unstable economic 
trends were seen in Latin America in the 1980s, resulting in calls for increase in social protection 
against the shocks of the global financial crises, and cash transfers grew there at this time (Garcia 
and Moore 2012, p. 32; Lavinas 2013).  
These are the debates on the import, influence, or merely recognizable aspects of Latin 
American or European social protection on Sub-Saharan African social protection programmes. 
What is important in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa is that social cash transfers have risen in 
the last decade as a form of targeted poverty alleviation programming, in response to the vast 
number of people living in states of chronic poverty from various causes (Barrientos 2011; Ellis, 
Devereux and White 2009; Ellis 2012; Ferguson 2015; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010; 
Lavinas 2013; Schubert and Slater 2006; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). Historically, this a 
context different from Europe but relatable to parts of Latin America. In Latin America and parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, there are clear histories of social protection rising in response of 
widespread levels of chronic poverty, and one where Mozambique’s history with cash transfers 
dates further back than most other countries on the continent. 
Evolutions in development strategy and a move away from food aid 
Other motivations for cash transfers are in their affordability and low implementation 
costs, abilities to reduce levels of poverty, and research showing that beneficiaries do not waste 
money but often use funds to enable wage labour (Ellis, Devereux and White 2009; Hanlon 2004; 
Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010). Some scholars argue that social cash transfers are 
imperative to any progressive development strategy, as they have the ability to lift people out of 
poverty traps due to a lack of money. Social cash transfer programmes are argued to be better 
than typical aid because putting cash directly into beneficiaries’ hands overlooks the hurdles of 
conditions tied to donor-driven agendas. This is referred to as the ‘Southern Alternative to 
Development’, where cash transfers directly assist people and allow them to make decisions on 
their own development instead of Western actors dictating means and measures for 
development (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, p. 143, 161). Furthermore, Lavinas (2013, p. 
39) adds that unconditional cash transfers have drawn praise from many quarters: “the 
Economist noted that they ‘work better than almost anyone would have expected’, and deny the 
stereotype of poor people as inherently feckless and ignorant”. Within the same debate, cash 
transfers are rationalized in some development agendas by their ability to challenge market 
liberal, Washington Consensus programmes of the World Bank and IMF (Midgley 2013, p. 6).  
Teresa N. Le- 441288 MA, Development Studies Research Report 2016 
 
14 
 
Social cash transfers have also risen in order to replace or decrease use of ‘inefficient’ 
food aid programmes that were the main poverty alleviation and emergency programmes of 
donors to Sub-Saharan Africa (Devereux 2013; Ellis 2012; Garcia and Moore 2012). Food aid has 
been deemed as expensive, difficult to access in some areas, and costly to administer and 
transport. There is the additional setback of the lack of choice they leave recipients with. 
Logistics and price became two considerations that donors and governments tried to improve 
upon in new social cash transfer programmes (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 34; Standing 2008).  
Thus, with food aid inefficiencies, the international community started to create ad-hoc 
humanitarian responses to food security shocks, and in some places these developed into ‘quasi -
institutionalized’ social assistance and social insurance mechanisms (Devereux 2013).  Critics of 
aid and food aid assert that they can alleviate symptoms of poverty and livelihood destruction 
but not the underlying causes. Some governments have started to design programmes that 
targeted individuals based on a longer-range view of employment status, whereas aid 
programmes still tend to look at temporary assistance to buffer situations of drought and 
livelihood loss. The debate of cash vs. food in Africa, until recently, has been a lobbyist debate 
between backward-looking, self-serving food aid and the ‘modern’, progressive, positive 
intervention of cash transfers (Devereux 2013, p. 16-17).  
Neoliberalism and economic growth  
A second set of motivations for social cash transfers stems from a concern with 
macroeconomic growth, stipulating that growth is constrained by lack of demand or purchasing 
power. This argument suggests that people need to be equipped with income or assets to boost 
the economy and mitigate future poverty through their own development (Hanlon and Smart 
2008, p. 156; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010).The rise in social protection has been related 
to Polanyi’s (2001, cited in Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 6) “assertion that the political impulse for  
social protection has its roots in the urge to re-embed processes of capitalist development with a 
more social logic, something that comparative research has identified as related to the adoption 
and extension of social protection in the Global South”. Debates on social protection today 
assert that they give individuals tools to directly impact their own growth; it is an investment in 
people in a privatized fashion, removed from the state (Ferguson 2009; 2015). Ferguson (2009) 
argues that social protection and cash transfers are neoliberal tools that critique state-provided 
welfare. Otherwise, most scholars recognize that social protection, and as will be addressed in 
later sections most neoliberal practices, require state assistance and structures to implement 
locally. Today, these views on the necessity of social protection as ‘investments’ in vulnerable 
populations to create economic stability are being employed widely as rationales for  nationally-
supported social protection floors (ILO 2015).  
Garcia and Moore (2012) take this argument further by stipulating that social cash 
transfer programmes can reduce the shocks of market imperfections at a less costly rate than 
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intervening in markets. From a utility-maximization perspective, social cash transfers enable 
greater utility than any other type of in-kind transfer such as food aid or even subsidies, because 
beneficiaries have a choice for how their cash can be useful to them and how they want to spend 
it (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 20). Furthermore, there are arguments that the distribution of 
cash directly into the hands of the poor is more effective than some public sector investments in 
areas such as infrastructure, governance reform, or other social protection programmes such as 
social insurance, because these investments tend to not trickle down to populations living in 
poverty, who require the most support (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 19). While there have been 
various views by politicians, development agencies and policy makers over time on the utility of 
social cash transfers to address poverty and unemployment, that view is broadly changing today 
(Ferguson 2015; Standing 2008). Ferguson (2015) points out that cash transfer programmes 
today are carried out in the Global South with support from institutions such as the World Bank, 
who, not long ago would not be in favor of the idea of giving money directly to poor people. This 
change in view comes at a time when large populations are without access to wage labour, 
which historically is a form of livelihood important to economic development and an “anchor to 
progressive politics”. Ferguson (2015, p.xii) calls this the “New Politics of Distribution”.   
Political motivations and the necessity of the state 
While many social cash transfer programmes have common characteristics depending on 
the economic and stability statuses of countries, the variance in social protection programmes 
could result from political motivations (Garcia and Moore 2012; Lavers and Hickey 2015). Social  
protection programmes can be crucial in times of political change, and there are examples where 
these programmes are used to silence groups in society who might become political opponents 
or undermine political agendas. Lavers and Hickey (2015, p. 6) support this when stating that 
drivers of growth in social protection in the Global South stem from the ability of expanding 
levels of inequality to require a political response to maintain social stability. In line with 
Barrientos et al. (2013), Lavers and Hickey (2015, p. 7-8) portray that research on the politics of 
social protection emphasise its growing utility towards political stability, legitimacy, and creation 
of a political settlement. Therefore, it can be a means of elites responding to or preempting 
bottom-up demands from society, or using it in an attempt to undermine political opposition. 
Thus, the outcomes of social protection and development programmes can closely relate to elite 
commitments to domestic political economy, in addition to transnational views on these 
programmes (Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 3). 
Two examples, given by Barrientos et al. (2013) were of Brazil and South Africa 
undergoing political transformations and at the same time renewing and expanding their social 
protection programmes.  In the case of South Africa, social assistance was used in a top-down 
fashion to compensate for the capital-intensive growth strategy that resulted in high levels of 
inequality and unemployment (Barrientos et al. 2013; Seekings and Nattrass 2005, cited in Lavers 
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and Hickey 2015). Economic growth for a minority, often elite group, existed alongside chronic 
poverty and unemployment for the majority, who would sometimes receive a social grant as a 
form of compensation, redistribution and furthermore a tool to legitimize the inequitable, 
neoliberal economic growth strategy (Leibbrandt & Woolard 2010, cited in Devereux 2013, p. 
18).  
In parts of the Global South,  some democratization processes included expanded social 
assistance to address poverty and inequality. This perspective portrays political motivation by 
the state to use social cash transfers to redress inequalities faced by marginalized groups, for 
example being born into poverty and governments wanting to emphasize or address equity 
through redistributive activities (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 20). Cash transfers are motivated in 
this case because their cash-based nature means that the state does not decide what will benefit 
groups or not, as in-kind transfers might. Similar to how Ellis, Devereux, and White (2009) use 
Sen’s capabilities approach to argue in favor of social protection, this emphasises a growing 
rights-based perspective in favor of social cash transfer programmes (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 
20). 
Social cash transfer programmes can originate outside of government institutions, too, 
but still have political motivations. Some argue that, historically, social protection in Sub-Saharan 
Africa had been implemented in a ‘piece meal’ manner with a lack of strategy supported by 
governments (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 32-33). By the 1980s, social protection arose in the 
form of limited ‘safety nets’, which turned emphasis away from previous institutionalized state-
household support (Ellis, Devereux and White 2009, p.5). Therefore, the World Bank’s late 1990 
risk management framework pushed for individualistic focuses for social funds and social safety 
nets, a clear shift away from collective responsibility of the state towards househol ds. Today, 
however, the focus has returned to promoting household level risk management in social 
protection (Townsend 1994; Dercon 2005 cited in Midgley 2013, p. 8). This example clearly 
highlights neoliberal, political motivations to liberalise social safety nets. Many low-income 
countries’ cash transfer programmes are classified as ‘donor driven’, however, many scholars 
support that cash transfer programmes must be domestically driven, have clear political 
credibility, and be designed to strengthen government institutions (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 
55; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, p. 162; Lavers and Hickey 2015).  
Scholars such as Ulriksen (2013) and Garcia and Moore (2012) suggest that the social 
protection policies of aid dependent countries in Southern Africa are determined by donors. It is 
also debated that “in comparison, in potential developmental coalitions, where elites have a 
longer time horizon, there is likely to be more space to pursue an ideological programme, and 
ruling elites are more likely to try to protect their decision making autonomy from donor 
influence” (Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 17). Therefore, it could be argued that social protection 
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policy deeply reflects the political ideology of a ruling coalition, when used as a tool to increase 
political stability or support the distributive ideals of the ruling coalition. When usage is 
unimportant for regime survival, however, there is more room for donor influence as the funding 
source (Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 18). 
What has been an observable trend in relation to donor roles in social protection growth 
has been the adoption of their policy framings (especially the International Labour 
Organization’s-ILO) by governments as a way to secure funding to grow their own (government-
based) social protection programmes. Acquisition of donor alliances in social protection 
programmes can also be an expression of receiving non-financial donor vote-of-confidence, 
therefore emphasizing external influence on these programmes and ruling coalition images or 
patronage (Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 17). While social protection agendas coming from the 
outside-in can be a form of top-down development, especially where social protection 
programmes do not exist, many parties acknowledge that transnational actors cannot implement 
social protection programmes without them being institutionalized through government 
support. This could be viewed as an expression of state autonomy and political uses of social 
protection (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Devereux 2013; Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 10; Pitcher 
2002; Weiss 2010). 
Social protection literature 
Development scholars working in social protection have historically relied on information 
coming from Eurocentric ‘welfare state’ approaches, which of course have their limitations in the 
developing world contexts. Midgley (2013, p. 5) states that the few studies on Africa, Asia and 
Latin America social protection tend to “conform to social policy’s macro and Eurocentric 
‘welfare state’ approach”. This literature review presents a different angle that social protection 
and cash transfer literature from Africa does exist, and African literature widely focuses on 
implementation, and not theory. While new programmes have created a body of literature on 
social protection, Midgley (2013) argues that there is insufficient analysis of meta-theoretical 
issues or even theorizing social protection, which will help not only scholars but practitioners 
hoping to improve the design and implementation of their own programmes.  
The lack of theory-based analyses on social protection and cash transfer programmes 
means that broadly speaking, these programmes become classified by the economic 
characteristics of the country from which they originate when discussed within academic and 
development literature. A World Bank study comparing cash transfer programmes throughout 
Sub-Saharan Africa makes distinctions between cash transfer programmes in low-income/fragile 
states, versus ones in middle income countries. Three distinguishing characteristics between 
programmes in these places are: 1. Inception before or after the year 2000; 2. Institutional  base 
of programmes and funding source from government or outside of government; and 3. Duration 
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of programmes as long-term or short-term (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 50). The second point is 
also emphasised by Midgley (2013, p. 7) in that many short-term programmes starting after 
2000 in low-income countries have funding sources from non-profit organizations and 
international donors, but this does not mean that governments are not involved as many social 
protection innovations have been started by or managed by governments.  These classifications 
become useful because they point to how different socio-economic circumstances might 
influence a country’s implementation of social protection. The middle income vs. low 
income/fragile division, however, polarizes most programmes into two groups, and removes 
room for programmes to draw characteristics from both typologies.  
1.ii.b. Debates against social protection and cash transfers 
The previous section addressed rationales in support of social protection and cash 
transfer growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The journey over the last two decades, however, has not 
always been met with complete support. On the right, the debate against social cash transfers 
resonates with European social welfare debates of handouts to able-bodied adults, also known 
as incentivizing ‘dependency syndrome’. These arguments are often backed up by classical 
economic theory and behavioral economics suggesting that the ‘poor’ are ill -equipped to make 
decisions for themselves, and that they will misspend money (Devereux 2013; Hanlon and Smart 
2008; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010; Lewis 1963; Schubert and Slater 2006). Devereux 
(2010 cited in Devereux 2013, p. 17) cites that there is little empir ical evidence supporting the 
existence of dependency syndrome in the case of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa. From the 
left, critiques of these programmes surround political motivations for social cash transfers, 
whereby countries engulfed in neoliberal economic policies are said to use social cash transfers 
as ‘palliative’ measures to quell social unrest regarding radical political reforms or alternative 
economic models. Examples of this are seen in Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia : countries 
with high levels of inequality (Devereux 2013, p. 18).  
Efficacy towards poverty alleviation 
Another important scholar of social cash transfers, Ellis (2012), has used empirical 
research on targeting mechanisms to argue that social cash transfers do not actually lift people 
out of poverty as suggested by Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme (2010). They can, however, impact 
levels of poverty. Thus, unlike the widespread gains of social cash transfers in Latin America, 
social cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa can be deemed as inefficient development tools 
because of logistical issues, social tension, and because of meager distinctions between the poor 
and extremely poor in targeted programmes (Ellis 2012; Hanlon and Smart 2008; Schubert and 
Slater 2006). Other critics of social cash transfers state that the targeting mechanisms can create 
social divides and unrest between those in different (by mere margins) poverty levels. Cash 
transfers can also become a breeding ground for corruption through governments and 
administrators, therefore funders need to maintain tight monitoring of social cash transfers (Ellis 
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2012; Hanlon and Smart 2008). Other debates regarding the efficacy of social protection and 
cash transfers has to do with the possibly negative consequences that these programmes can 
have on economic development. Supporters of this viewpoint suggest that it is up to individuals 
and families to fund their own incomes and catalyze their own development (Midgley 2013, p. 
10). Social policy research that provides evidence against these claims is widely ignored.  
Welfare as a luxury 
 In addition, there are debates on the appropriate timing for a state to provide social 
protection and cash transfers, and these resonate with welfare debates. Midgley (2013, p. 6) 
presents that, “Income transfers were widely regarded as an expensive luxury that developing 
countries could not afford, and they were believed to detract from development priorities, which 
required investment rather than consumption expenditure.” Typical Northern welfare theory 
suggests that welfare comes as a ‘luxury’, post-industrialisation (Evans 2010; Hanlon and Smart 
2008; Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010, p. 161). These debates present that the affordability 
and ability for a country to provide welfare is only when the country has industrialised and 
therefore has funds in the national budget to give money to citizens. Market liberals and those 
opposed to government intervention argue that these programmes are unsustainable without 
imposing heavy taxes that will damage the economy (Midgley 2013, p. 8).  Devereux (2002, p. 
658) adds that “social safety nets are regarded by neo-liberal critics as fiscally unaffordable 
compensatory mechanisms that make no effective contribution to sustainable poverty 
reduction, and by left-wing critics as token handouts to make harsh neo-liberal reforms 
politically palatable, or to avoid taking real actions to redress the structural cause of poverty and 
vulnerability”. Thus, neoliberal viewpoints can be used against and in support of cash transfers, 
and the views of neoliberalism with regards to state activity will be addressed in the next section. 
1.ii.c. Neoliberalism and the role of the state  
Neoliberalism is often regarded as a ‘political project’ of the Bretton Woods Institutions  
(BWI) aimed at transforming “political and economic [post-war] settlements… including labour 
market accords, industrial relations systems, redistributive tax structures and social welfare 
programs” in the Global North (Weiss 2010, p. 6). Neoliberalism spread to have the popular 
meaning as the political ideology in line with economic globalization and the spread of financial 
capitalism (Harvey 2005, Dumenil and Levy 2011, Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn (2012) cited in 
Flew 2014, p. 56). Many scholars relate neoliberal policy as “aimed to restore capitalist class 
power in the aftermath of the economic and social crises of the 1970s….. and one where, in 
Harvey’s terms, ‘the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such [neoliberal] practices’” (Harvey 2005:2 cited in Flew 2014, p. 56). 
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Neoliberalism in Africa 
  In the context of the Global South, neoliberalism took the form of policy measures forced 
on Latin American and African states through Structural Adjustment Programmes targeted at 
liberalizing perceived ‘corrupt’ state institutions. These included policy changes necessary for 
receiving financial support from Bretton Woods Institutions for economic restructuring (Flew 
2014). The ‘state-phobic’ lens of neoliberalism in Afr ica, as noted by Mkandawire (2001, p. 294) 
stems from ‘Afropessimism’ due to the ‘dismal performances’ of many ‘oppressive and 
overbearing’ post-independence African states (Ferguson 2006, p. 38). Jinadu (2010, p. 6757) 
points out the neoliberal argument that African socialism and other practices of one-party states 
post-independence created market imperfections, therefore stunting state capacity through 
denying individual thought and choice.  
  Corruption and ‘weak state capacity’ thus became rationales for neo-liberalism’s 
intervention and push to roll-back the state, with the view that states were ill-equipped and 
overextended to take on the task of development. Despite these Afro-pessimistic views, 
Mkandawire (2010, p. 20) points out that for most the 1970s, the income of most African 
countries increased in absolute and relative terms, and the welfare of societies improved at slow 
paces. Regardless of these realities, anti-statist views of external financial institutions grew in 
African countries in the 1980s. Neoliberal policies then attacked ‘big government’ through 
creating terms for what the state should not do, and pushed for a reduction of state autonomy 
to act within economic, and at times social, affairs (Ferguson 2009; Mkandawire 2001; Weiss 
2010, p. 4). Mkandawire (2001) further emphasized that neoliberalism creates a list of tasks for 
the state to respond to or uphold, in order to promote privatization and a free-market with the 
goal of reducing of the role of the state. Thus, the paradox of neoliberalism in Africa in that it 
attributes poor economic performances to ‘overly interventionist states’ and therefore tried to 
retract the state as a way to curb accumulation of state wealth and power. On the other hand, 
the welcoming of neoliberal international financial institutions (IFIs) and adoption of their SAPs 
reinforced the idea that African states are weak, and authority easily falls to the hands of 
outsiders (Pitcher 2002). 
Through invoking the work of Weber and Marx, Evans (1995) argues towards the 
centrality of the role of the state, specifically with regards to the people within its territory.  
Jinadu (2010, p. 6753, 6755) explores African state capacity in light of neoliberalism and 
globalization, recognizing the character of states to renew, regenerate and re-invent themselves, 
which in turn impacts state capacity. Tracing the history of state capacity throughout the colonial 
era in Africa, Jinadu (2010) asserts that authoritarian colonial leadership led to the 
underdevelopment of state capacity. Colonization, through its “interdependence of the domestic 
and external political economies”, led to fragile economic and political institutions, and weak 
human resource endowments resulting in an underdeveloped state capacity and autonomy 
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against institutions of globalization (Jinadu 2010). The same is debated regarding neoliberal 
ideology and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Jinadu 2010).  
Views of neoliberal successes in state roll-back 
While institutions such as the World Bank claim that their neoliberal practices of 
structural adjustment programmes in Africa had many success stories, such as Mozambique, 
different scholars refute the level of success that can be measured during this period (De Renzio 
and Hanlon 2007; Ferguson 2006; Hanlon and Smart 2008; Pitcher 2002). The World Bank 
defines ‘success stories’ through high growth rates, restoration of normal economic activity 
following growth-interrupting civil wars, and how well states adopted neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy and free market practices (Ferguson 2006, p. 212). Other scholars, such as Marshall 
(1990), point out the irresponsible decisions of the BWIs in motivating for drastic economic 
policy changes in countries that were in the midst of civil wars. The consequences of these 
economic constraints were economic stagnation instead of economic recovery, and a rise in 
inequality (Ferguson 2007, p. 11). Evans (1995, p.4) asserts that, “fervent calls for the 
dismantling of the state by the late-twentieth-century capitalist free-marketers served to derail 
the state’s ability to act as an instrument of distributive justice, but not to reduce its overall 
importance”.  
As argued by Weiss (2010, p. 20) there was evidence of liberalising reforms during the 
neoliberal era, such as privatisation of state entities, financial liberalisation, etc. Policy 
liberalisation, however, did not result in a ‘rolled-back’ state. This is because neoliberalism 
widely depended on the state to create conditions, such as labour market regulation, corporate 
governance, and infrastructure resources, for neoliberal activity to carry out (Weiss 2010, p.2). 
This view, as additionally supported by Ferguson (2009), Herbst (1990), and Jinadu (2010), shows 
that the state and neoliberalism must in fact coexist, at different capacities within market and 
economic activity towards liberalization. Jinadu (2010, p. 6757) adds to this critique of 
neoliberalism when stating that its weakness was that it over-emphasized non-intervention in 
market forces, “especially when so-called market policies conflict with social goals that must 
remain the responsibility of the African state, given the reality of underdevelopment and the 
problem of state capacity it underscores.”  Therefore, the binary view of existence and non-
existence of state autonomy is unnecessary in today’s debates of neoliberalism.  
Other scholars have pointed out that despite attempts through SAPs to weaken the role 
of the state in economic policy, because of levels of poverty in Africa, the state will always have a 
dominant economic role. Herbst (1990, p. 955) illustrated that “African states will be caught in 
the particularly frustrating position of being the dominant economic organizations within the 
country, but being limited in the extent to which they can actually intervene in the economy.” In 
reality, Mkandawire (2001, p. 308) points out that reduction in public expenditure was justified 
Teresa N. Le- 441288 MA, Development Studies Research Report 2016 
 
22 
 
as response to fiscal crises, but did not lead to a ‘roll back of the state’, however, a drastic 
erosion of state capacity. As emphasized by Miller (2010, p. 56, cited in Flew 2014, p. 60), the 
“grand contradiction of neo-liberalism was its passion for intervention in the name of non-
intervention”. Critical approaches such as these are problematic, however, because they fail to 
highlight the importance of state institutions, their autonomy, and ability to influence political 
and economic outcomes (Skocpol 2008, cited in Flew 2014, p. 58). Ferguson (2009, p. 183) adds 
to this by arguing that it is unproductive to view neoliberalism as ‘evil’, as this blocks discourse 
from viewing the influence that neoliberalism has had on state capacity and power. These 
discussions on the actual roles of states while under neoliberal influence will become important 
when considering state autonomy in social action, too.  
Herbst (1990, p. 953) debates SAPs and the World Bank’s views of ‘successful’ state roll-
back when showing that their own publications, such as Accelerated Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa (1981), critiques of state intervention in the economy are present, but the 
publication never defines what the role of the state should be, or a vision for the state, thus how 
is success measured? Flew (2014, p. 51) even argues that the usage of the term ‘neoliberalism’ is 
“intellectually unsustainable, particularly where it functions as an all -purpose denunciatory 
category.. or where it is simply invoked as ‘the way things are’”. Mkandawire (2001) adds that in 
stating that neoliberalism, specifically SAPs and their measures to weaken state capacity, created 
such high levels of inequality that became rationale for state intervention and further interest in 
playing a central role in economic growth. While is it pointed out that the ‘disillusionment with 
the state’ as an aspect of neoliberalism that waned by the 1990s, Evans (1995, p. 22-23) adds to 
Mkandawire (2001), Jinadu (2010) and Ferguson (2009) when claiming that the real set-back of 
neoliberalism was that it did not separate what the state was able to do versus unlikely to do, 
while focusing on improving state performance; neoliberalism simply ‘demonized the state’ and 
did not do much further. 
Legacies of neoliberalism 
 Long term, the push to ‘roll back the state’ has resulted in what Ferguson (2006) refers as 
a lack of confidence, or provocation of a far-reaching political crisis, from Africans on their 
national governments regarding their macroeconomic processes or assisting the day-to-day 
living conditions of their people. Because of this, many people return to kin-based social 
systems, ethnic separation, and religious movements for support, or reliance on external 
technical assistance and donor support. Therefore, neoliberal views on the state role resulted in 
a shift in how states would begin to legitimize their policies, and this provided more strength to 
external organizations to influence decisions. The ‘moral language’ of African socialism of the 
1970s was replaced through the state adoption of the idea of structural adjustment, often in 
times of duress, to address their own state ‘inefficiencies’ and as a ‘necessity’ for economic 
growth (Ferguson 2006, p. 77). The austerity practices that intended on rolling back the state in 
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favor of markets increased corruption and rent-seeking, and what Hibou (2004, cited in Ferguson 
2006, p. 11) calls “the privatization of the state”. This included social services and development 
work becoming privatized too, in the sense that these services moved away from the state 
sector and into the hands of international development agencies and NGOs. These parties also 
moved their strategies away from implementation through government and instead working 
with grassroots channels and civil society (Ferguson 2006). Different from western neoliberal 
reform, whereby the result has been ‘less state interference and inefficiency’, Ferguson (2006 p. 
39) argues that in Africa, the replacement of the state role in social services by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), means less order, peace and security.  
1.ii.d. Argument rationale based on literature 
 Although scholars are starting to critically examine gaps where neoliberal ideology itself 
fails to address its reliance on the state, there are still gaps portraying where state autonomy did 
exist under neoliberalism constraints beyond economic affairs, for example in social services. 
Herbst (1990, p. 954) makes the important point that, “True adoption of structural adjustment 
policies will prevent the state from offering subsidies or some other political good if a group 
becomes disaffected or if a leader suddenly needs to garner public support,” and this point will 
add to evidence on the effectiveness of neoliberalism to roll -back states. In addition, how have 
the perceived ‘constraints’ of neoliberalism created dynamics motivating the state to push back 
and autonomously pursue action in response to neoliberalism-induced issues such as inequality 
and poverty? Mkandawire (2010, p. 49) asserts that neoliberalism’s motivation to dismantle 
states as “effective policy reform and adjustment” included dismantling the social agenda of 
provision of basic healthcare, education and pro-poor targeted programmes. Therefore, while 
neoliberalism’s efforts to reign in states clearly included social activity too, there is less literature 
defining the capabilities of state-sponsored social action under neoliberalism. Ferguson (2015) 
also claims that narratives of neoliberalism are blind to the needs for social protection, and this 
adds to the motivation of this research to understand the social protection efforts of states 
during neoliberalism. The case of cash transfers in Mozambique will be imperative in order to 
demonstrating the role and extent of state autonomy in social policy in response to the 
detrimental impact on welfare and social development caused by neoliberal policy.  
Mozambique has created at least four social cash transfer programmes in the last 20 
years and a comprehensive social protection sector, yet the state’s rationale for direct 
involvement and funding is unclear (Handa et al. 2012). What is missing from academic literature 
is an analysis of why the Mozambican state has been adopting social cash transfer programmes 
during neoliberal era state restricted capabilities, and how these arguments fit into wider 
debates on the state’s autonomy during neoliberalism in countries of the Global South where 
structural adjustment programmes had adverse impact on society. If, as suggested by Hanlon, 
Barrientos and Hulme (2010), social cash transfers are a ‘Southern Alternative’ to development 
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and have not been a result of hands-outs from the North, why did they emerge in Mozambique: 
a low-income, fragile state, and what does this portray about state autonomy? 
Lastly, review of literature on social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa revealed the sizable 
gap in literature on Mozambique’s cash transfer  and social protection programmes in 
comparison to other places. While it has been noted that Mozambique has had cash transfer 
programmes longer than most countries on the continent, places such as Botswana, Namibia 
and Lesotho are often focused on with regards to Southern Africa social protection (Devereux 
2013; Ferguson 2015). Even with regards to the link between natural resources and funding 
sources for social protection, a study done by Ulriksen (2013) compared nine other countries in 
the Southern Africa region, while leaving out Mozambique, a country that has a high amount of 
natural resources and a diversity of cash transfer programmes. Therefore, this research wi l l  a im 
to insert Mozambique’s case of cash transfers within Sub-Saharan African cases as a means to 
see how this case either supports social protection and cash transfer trajectories or how it 
proves to be an exceptional case that can exemplify unique state capacity characteristics.  
1.iii. Methodology 
A research question probing at how the Mozambican state was able to act during 
neoliberalism restrictions required historical tracing of the processes and debates of the case 
being used in this research: social cash transfers. History tracing focused on the origins and 
rationales of these programmes to understand the state’s motivation to start these programmes. 
Additionally, emphasis was placed on the constraints and debates around them given the 
environment of the country and involvement of external actors. This process was performed 
through the predominant use of documentary analysis of policy, national development strategy 
papers, organizational reports, budgets, and political party records. Documentary analysis was 
complemented by in-depth interviews with past and current actors involved with Mozambican 
social cash transfer programmes. Policy documents and government strategy papers enabled 
tracing the roots of and pinpointing the evolution of the role of the state from the 1970s to 
today, in social action and eventually cash transfer programmes. Interviews with specific 
government entities, NGOs and development institutions directly involved in cash transfer 
lobbying, research and implementation provided original data on the inception and use of social  
cash transfers over time, and filled gaps where documentary analysis inadequately portrayed 
why cash transfers had been adopted. 
1.iii.a. Process or History Tracing 
In their own work on the political economies of social protection programmes, Lavers and 
Hickey (2015, p.22) describe ‘process tracing’ as a theoretically-based historical explanation of a 
sequence of events used within case analysis, that has the purpose of understanding causal 
relationships through examining the mechanisms by which they are produced. This process 
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critically engages competing hypotheses that might explain a particular phenomenon, to 
enhance the validity of a causal explanation (George and Bennett 2004, cited in Lavers and 
Hickey 2015, p. 22). Process tracing, for the purpose of Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) study involved 
a historical analysis of social policy and social protection within specific national contexts, in 
order to compare recent policy developments to the contexts of past programmes and their 
legacies. Process tracing can include analyses around the ideas that have framed national  social  
policy debates; the utilities of social protection (economics, social action, politics) and the 
expectations of social protection within development strategy. For process tracing,  literature 
also suggests that documentary and archival evidence provide useful evidence, as well as key 
informant interviews because of their witnessing in events and their ability to refute and confirm 
information from documents or reconstruct undocumented events. These insights on process 
tracing informed the questionnaire for the interviews carried out with social protection 
stakeholders in Mozambique (George and Bennett 2004, Tansey 2007, cited in Lavers and Hickey 
2015 p. 23).1 
1.iii.b. Documentary Analysis 
Documents are ‘social facts’ that are produced, organised, and used in social ways, and a 
documentary analysis describes the systematic procedure for analysing these documents in 
order to create meaning and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009, p. 27). Documentary 
analysis provided evidence for the shifting or continuous position of the state with social policy 
and cash transfers, dating back from the post-independence period of Mozambique. Information 
from specific documents helped illustrate the role of the state and its type of autonomy in 
decision-making during the neoliberal era as seen through policy and programmes implemented 
at a specific time. The utility of documentary analysis in case research lies in its ability to produce 
rich descriptions of a single phenomenon, organization, event, or programme (Bowen 2009, p. 
29). Furthermore, documentary analysis has five main uses: 1. Setting context; 2. Suggesting 
questions that need to be asked, that can be enquired in interviews; 3. Serving as supplementary 
research data or a knowledge base; 4. Providing means of tracking change and development; 
and 5. Using documents to verify findings (Bowen 2009, p. 30).  
 Although the Mozambican state is technically ‘present’ throughout the period of this 
study, documentary analysis showed what it was able to do in terms of social protection activity, 
and how, neoliberal ideology, through policy, attempted to constrain it. Furthermore, policy 
showing the shifting position and role of the state in poverty reduction strategy and cash 
transfer implementation also provided evidence on the extent and how the state has pushed 
back on neoliberal restriction mechanisms. Documentary analysis also helped language barr iers 
(with most people speaking Portuguese) and also the process of history tracing, as most 
                                                                 
1 Sample questionnaire can be found in the appendices section 
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interviewees had shorter tenures in Mozambique than the period of this study. Thus, documents 
helped locate a specific period 20 years ago, that most people could not shed much light on.  
1.iii.c. In-depth Interviews 
Although documentary analysis can give a historical and policy-based perspective on the 
constraints and abilities of the Mozambican state during neoliberalism, in-depth interviews 
provided rich detail in support of or contesting what was portrayed in documents. As literature 
gaps have shown a deficit in detail on the state’s role in welfare and cash transfer programmes 
under neoliberalism and in Mozambique, in-depth interviews with actors involved with cash 
transfers were necessary. Interviews in Maputo and over Skype were semi-structured and aimed 
to include a Portuguese interpreter when necessary.   
It was crucial to interview state and non-state actors related to these programmes and to 
welfare development in Mozambique as a way to observe embedded relationships, and whether 
or not as well as the extent that they influence each other. Evans (1995, p.9) portrays that, 
“interviews with dozens of current and former government officials were the primary source of 
understanding of what was going on inside these states and the starting point for the description 
of state roles.” Therefore, my sampling site for interviews, as well as documents to analyse, wa s 
international and state-based institutions and development organisations in Mozambique, with a 
deliberate decision of purposive sampling to focus on authoritative and administrative actors of 
the past and present. In his own work on analyzing state autonomy, Evans (1995) invoked the 
use of comparative institutional approach as a strategy of gathering information because he 
describes that states are products of their societies, but also pawns of games with other actors. 
Therefore, a comparative institutional approach works because it portrays patterns of 
relationships rather than one historical, generic explanation. This process helped collect 
information across institutions and time that located a specific set of contexts under which sta te 
policies were produced. 
 As my research question focused on investigating state autonomy in the case of cash 
transfers, the sampling site rested in decision makers and authorities related to the state, thus 
there was not a necessity to understand views of cash transfer recipients. The rationale to 
include development organisations and non-state institutions drew from Ferguson’s (2009, p. 
168) argument that NGOs have played a ‘de-facto government’ role reminiscent of a 20th 
century social welfare states, in ‘social’ activities in Mozambique. There was significant evidence 
of this involvement seen in policy suggestions and development reports regarding the 
Mozambican social protection floor and cash transfer programmes from these non-state actors.  
It was therefore critical to my argument to challenge and unpack this claim in comparison to 
state activity. My sample size was 10 interviews, and this number reflected the potential scope 
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of available participants who interact with the sector on a non-recipient basis.2  In order to 
ensure anonymity and ethical considerations for in-depth interviews, voluntary participants were 
able to self-identify (name and position in organization) or have the choice to leave their identity 
anonymous. As the specific site of research was in the capital city of Maputo, Portuguese 
language consideration had been incorporated into this study. An interpreter was covered under 
ethics clearance, however, for all but one interview, participants were able to conduct interviews 
in English. A substantial amount of documents sought out for the documentary analysis were 
available in English, and only one document from INAS as well as the interview questionnaire 
were translated into Portuguese. 
A blend of both interviews and documentary analysis as my data collection methods for 
this research hoped to address the constraints of both methods. The use of interviews in general  
was important to get to the core of information that is not available in English written 
documents, which is typical for a place such as Mozambique whose written recent history is less -
available through English scholarly work. The utility as well as the setbacks embedded in the 
interpretation process were apparent, and interview information considered these complexities 
in the analysis. In addition, documents available were not just read for information extraction, 
but were read critically and based on positionality of authors. For the context of Mozambique, i t 
became evident that information presented in spoken word or through text was often subjective 
to the personal history of the presenter (Reis 2012). Therefore, in an attempt to fill gaps in 
information regarding the history and perceptions on social cash transfers in Mozambique, data 
collection for this research strongly considered personal background and position of scholars and 
interviewees, and critically used information gathered from documents and interviews to 
support, refute, and challenge each other. 
In the month of August, I performed ten in-depth interviews with key informants involved 
in cash transfer programmes and the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Mozambique. The 
constraints of this data collection process were: time limits in Maputo due to visa constraints 
allowing for one month field work; limited access to government officials for interviews and 
certain government documents (archives); turnover of development workers, therefore lack of 
sufficient historical knowledge or institutional knowledge in Mozambique; certain important 
government stakeholders were no longer in Mozambique out of personal choice or relating to 
the political ideology transition from socialism to capitalism-backed development. Similar  to the 
experience of Evans (1995, p. 19) when performing interviews with former and current 
government officials for his work on embedded autonomy, the interview process was performed 
with the understanding that participants offer accounts of history and relationships based on 
their own biases and self-interests, which is highly influenced from their positions within their 
                                                                 
2 List of contacted and scheduled interviews is available in the appendices section 
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own government or non-government institutions. In agreement with Evans (1995), these biases 
are crucial pieces of evidence themselves, and positionality is considered within the body of this 
research. While more interviews with government officials would have added favorably to 
research, as mentioned in the above constraints, time and language barrier presented the 
greatest access challenges to the government sector. Despite these constraints, the field work 
and documentary analysis provided ample information that will be presented in the remainder of 
this research report. 
1.iv. Outline of Research 
The next two chapters focus on two periods of cash transfer programmes in Mozambique. 
While documents from the United Nations (UN) and other external organizations state that the 
periods of cash transfer programmes should be distinguished between pre-2005 and 2005-
today, these dates are influenced by the policy adoption of a 2007 Social Protection Law with 
little consideration of Mozambique’s first programme- GAPVU (Gabinete de Apoio à População 
Vulnerável)3 and its history (Chivambo 2015; UN 2015). The second chapter focuses on the 
period while GAPVU existed as its own organization that implemented the PSA (1990-1997) and 
the third chapter presents the period of the PSA falling under the National Institute for Social 
Action (INAS) and the Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS) (1997 –today). The fourth 
chapter is a thematic discussion of how the case of Mozambique fits into wider debates 
regarding the growth of social protection and cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as 
ways that this case is different from the typical conceptions of these programmes. Chapter four 
also engages with debates on the role of the state while confined by neoliberalism and how 
Mozambique’s social cash transfer example refutes or contributes to discussions on 
neoliberalism. The fifth chapter concludes by touching on the implications of this research on 
Mozambique’s development trajectory. 
 
  
                                                                 
3  GAPVU-literal translation: Office to Assist At-Risk Populations (Devereux 2002; Datt et al. 1997; Low et al. 1999; 
Schubert 1992) 
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2. Chapter Two: GAVPU- Mozambique’s First Cash Transfer 
Programme  
2.i. Introduction 
Schubert (1992), Low et. al (1999) and Taimo and Waterhouse (2007, p. 1) are some of 
the few scholars to highlight that Mozambique’s Gabinete de Apoio a Populacao Vulneravel or 
‘Office for the Assistance of Vulnerable Populations’ (GAPVU) cash transfer has been a ‘rare 
example’ of state-led social security or social protection programming that has received 
continuous funding over a long period of time. Starting in 1989-1990 under the conditions of 
structural adjustment, civil war and economic hardship, GAPVU is a case that presents an 
atypical example of low-income state capacity towards welfare provision. While the start date of 
this programme is not widely published, when comparing its 1990 start date against a World 
Bank study on cash transfer programmes across Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique’s GAVPU and 
its more recent identity as the PSA (Programa Subidio de Alimentos- Food Subsidy Programme) 
and today as the PSSB (Basic Social Security Programme) would be the fourth oldest, 
continuously running programme on the African continent (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 47). It 
comes after Mauritius’ Old Age Pension, Namibia’s Pension and South Africa’s Old Age Grant, 
and therefore Mozambique has one of the oldest histories of non-contributory cash transfers on 
the continent.  Of poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique was the first to 
implement a cash transfer programme (G20 France 2011; Schubert 2015). This chapter presents 
a case study of GAPVU in order to portray the limited conditions under which the Mozambican 
government deployed its first social cash transfer programme, as a political and social 
mechanism of continuing its welfare agenda while under the constraints of structural adjustment 
policies. Analyzing the history of GAPVU allows for the argument that the Mozambican state did 
attempt to maintain its socialist political ideology towards equality and pro-poor, inclusive 
development despite the influences of external actors and neoliberalism’s emphasis on state 
roll-back and a minimized state role. While a small case, GAPVU’s ability to start and run without 
challenging WB structural adjustment policies and at the same time enable the state to provide a 
type of solidarity to the urban masses, are aspects that have led to the continuous survival and 
longevity of this programme.  
2.ii. The Setting of Mozambique Before GAPVU’s Start 
Pinpointing a start date of Mozambique’s first cash transfer programme  was a more 
difficult task than would be expected, and mixed information about the start date of this 
programme has implications for its analysis. Depending if one’s history comes from the public 
sector, development sector, or civil society sector, the start date can be stated as 1990, 1993, or  
even 2007 when Mozambique’s National Socia l Protection Law was created (Alane 2015; 
Chivambo 2015; Datt et al. 1997; Low et al. 1999; Fernandes 2015; Garcia and Moore 2012; Reba 
and Taimo 2007; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). Even with some sources attributing 2007 as 
the start date of Mozambique’s social protection, there is general acknowledgement that the 
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government has been giving out cash transfers since the mid-1990s (Chivambo 2015; Greany 
2015; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009).  GAPVU’s history is not well-known in recent literature 
on social protection in Mozambique or Sub-Saharan Africa. This is evident in the division 
between referring to the first cash transfer programme GAPVU versus the PSA:  food subsidy 
programme (Garcia and Moore 2012; INAS 2013; Low et al. 1999). The food subsidy programme 
was the specific name of the cash transfer that GAPVU implemented, however in most studies 
performed before 2000, GAPVU is what the whole cash transfer programme was known as. 
More recent studies state that the first cash transfer was called the PSA without referring to 
GAVPU. Notably, the PSA was replaced by the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) in 2011, 
and this the largest programme that continues to run today under the National Institute for 
Social Action- Instituto Nacional de Acção Social (INAS) (G20 France 2011; Selvester 2012). This 
shift in calling the first cash transfer GAPVU versus the PSA can most likely be attributed to the 
closing of GAPVU’s office in 1997 and the PSA continuing on through INAS, later to evolve to the 
PSSB (Low et. al 1999; Massingarela and Nhate 2006).  
Discussions on the creation of GAPVU and the PSA date back to 1987, with a government 
resolution for implementation dating to 1990 (Datt et al. 1997; INAS 2013; Low et al. 1999; 
Massingarela and Nhate 2006; Schubert 1992; Schubert 2015; Standing 2008; Taimo and 
Waterhouse 2007). This start date is critical to highlight given the landscape of Mozambique in 
the previous years and most notably the late 1980s: just over a decade into the civil war 
between the Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) 4 and Renamo (Resistência Nacional  
Moçambicana)5 political parties, high levels of inflation and exchange rate volatility, economic 
difficulties creating hardships on social life as consequence to structural adjustment programme 
(SAP) adoption in the mid-80s, heavy dependence on foreign aid and emergency relief, and mass 
internal and external migration resulting from violence and instability in rural areas (Hanlon 
1996; Massingarela and Nhate 2006; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). Marshall (1990, p. 28) 
describes the acceptance of SAP conditions and their implementation through the Mozambican 
government’s 1986 Economic Recovery Plan (PRE) as “the loss to the IMF and Wor ld Bank over 
economic policy”. While Mozambique showed signs of economic growth in 1987 and 1988 in 
terms of gross domestic product, which could be a result of structural adjustment via the PRE  or 
delayed impact of state economic planning from the early 1980s, human suffering as a 
consequence of SAPs led to a situation of “survival at all costs for many” (Hanlon 1996; Marshal l  
1990, p. 29).  
The intensification of pressure on the government from the IMF and the World Bank 
through SAPs at a time of armed conflict created a situation of rising unemployment due to the 
privatization process, increasing food prices due to a removal of food subsidies and by 1988, 
“half of the urban and two-thirds of the rural population were absolutely poor…where basic food 
providing two-thirds of caloric requirements costs more than half the income.” (Hanlon 1996, p. 
                                                                 
4 Translates to ‘Mozambican Liberation Front’ 
5 Translates to’ Mozambican National Resistance’ 
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70; Marshall 1990, p. 31; Massingarela and Nhate 2006). These negative consequences of SAPs 
on the lives of Mozambicans became a recurrent theme within the Frelimo party up until their 
Fifth Congress in July 1989 (Marshall 1990, p. 28). Studies were carried out by the Ministry of 
Health and by consultants regarding the impact of the PRE/adjustment programme on cost of 
living, health and nutritional statuses of urban dwellers, many who had relocated because of the 
armed conflicts in rural areas. These studies concluded that there was clear “underestimation of 
the social costs of the economic recovery programme and a failure to question the 
inappropriateness of adopting the IMF formula of depressing urban incomes and channeling 
resources to the rural areas in a country at war” (Marshall 1990, p. 30).   
Government thus felt compelled to cover a minimum set of basic needs to the very poor 
in urban areas (Antunes 2015; Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 16; Salomao 2015). On 
November 13, 1988, Prime Minister Machungo announced the Government was preparing 
measures to “protect vulnerable groups in society from the effects of the PRE and indicated that 
donors had expressed their willingness to support such programmes at a recent World Bank 
Consultative Group meeting in Paris” (Marshall 1990, p. 40). These measures included a social 
fund to subsidize the price of medicine for the chronically ill and for low-income workers. While 
donors supported the social fund and subsidy efforts, in the coming year the Government would 
instate its own intervention in the form of GAPVU. Although the end of urban food price 
subsidies was officially marked by the IMF in 1988, the Government of Mozambique was already 
underway in devising its solution to replace the poorly rated urban food subsidies with a 
programme that would be more accessible and had more direct impact (Garcia and Moore 2012; 
Marshall 1990; Schubert 2015). Massingarela and Nhate (2006, p. 7) note that, “In 1990, 
Mozambique was the lowest income country, according to World Bank Data. Despite the formal  
opening up of the economic regime, the war remained intense and the economic collapse was 
deepening.” 
From the Government’s perspective, Dr. Tomaz Salomao (2015) explained in an interview 
how the economic team, led by Prime Minister (former Minister of Planning) Mario Machungo, 
and the Minister of Finance, Magid Osman, needed to devise a way to support the urban poor 
who were forcefully displaced by the civil war and affected by rapid inflation. It was a situation 
whereby most public expenditure was either cut by SAPs or channeled to the army in order to 
protect and defend the country. Coincidently, in December of 1987, there was a meeting held by 
the World Bank, IMF and the Minister of Finance, and it resulted in a split between the Bank and 
the IMF regarding a decision to end urban food subsidies (Hanlon 1996, p. 3). The compromise 
between the Bank and the IMF was to cut ‘unproductive’ food subsidies and focus on creating 
safety nets for the poor. The split between the World Bank and IMF could be read as a signal to 
the Ministry of Finance of the necessity for it to own its role in the creation of Mozambique’s 
first cash transfer programme, outside of the World Bank and IMF. The creation of the GAPVU 
cash transfer is attributed by most to a team made up of the Minister of Finance, the Deputy 
Minister of Health, and a social advisor who was a World Bank consultant, Professor Reginald 
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Green, who was also involved in Government’s evaluations of the PRE/SAP social costs (Green 
1991; Hanlon 1996; p. 93; Schubert 1992, p. 111; Schubert 2015).  
Thus, the state-led idea of a Mozambican cash transfer can date back to late 1987 and 
early 1988, with its official politically-backed start date of June 1990. This year and a half period 
gave the Ministry of Finance ample time to devise a programme that would fit into the financial  
and authoritative constraints caused by civil war conditions and the backlash of structural 
adjustment on government spending capabilities. The consultant team needed to create a 
programme that would be able to reach out to a large number of people at a very low cost, and 
that could be implemented by the limited institutional human resources and infrastructure 
available, constraints attributed to the departure of the Portuguese colonial authority in 1975 
and lack of government budget to expand because of SAPs (Hanlon 1996). A new programme 
also needed to not repeat the shortfalls of the food security and food subsidy programmes that 
were under critical debate in the late 1980s (Schubert 1992, p. 111). Lastly, this time in between 
the debates on the inefficiencies on food subsidies and discussions on a new programme for 
vulnerable populations also allowed the Minister of Finance time to get the Minister of 
Councilors to officially pass a bill to create GAPVU, showing a sign of strong political will and 
state support financially and politically behind this programme from its start (Massingarela and 
Nhate 2006; Schubert 1992, p. 112). In an interview with the first technical expert to GAPVU, 
Bernd Schubert (2015), it was described that the spirit of GAPVU’s inception was one where 
suddenly the Government came up with the idea, “Why don’t we just give people money?”  
GAPVU was officially launched as a unit within the Ministry of Finance and Planning 
through the Internal Resolution No. 2/90 of the Council of Ministers of the Government of the 
Republic of Mozambique on the 26th of June, 1990 (INAS 2013, p. 1; Low et al 1999, p. 5; 
Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 11, 30). The mission of GAVPU was “to channel social 
assistance in the form of cash transfers (unearned income) to destitute urban households in 
order to ensure their survival” (Massingarela and Nhate 2006; Schubert 1992, p. 110; Schubert 
2015; Standing 2008).  Later that year in September, the implementing office (GAPVU) put out its 
first set of cash transfers, known as the food subsidy programme (PSA), with an initial outreach 
of 23 households. This number went up to 572 households by the end of the first cycle of the 
programme and 2,000 households by the end of 1991 (Low et al, 1999; Massingarela and Nhate 
2006; Schubert 1992). The initially low coverage of GAPVU, which sometimes is estimated at only 
19 beneficiary persons at the end of 1990, was cause for concern laid out by the Minister of 
Finance. In a meeting on May 27, 1991, a decision was made to reorganize the programme and 
bring in an external consultant (Bernd Schubert) to improve coverage rapidly or cancel the 
programme (Low et al 1999; Schubert 2015).  
This pressure resulted in GAPVU growing by the end of 1991 to 2000 households, in 1993 
reaching 54,000 beneficiary households and at its height in 1995-1996 it reached between 
85,000-92,300 beneficiary households (Datt et al, 1997, p. 1; Hanlon 1996, p. 70; Low et al 1999, 
p. 22; Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 11; Schubert 1993 cited in Low et. al 1999). Funding for 
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GAPVU cash transfers came entirely from the Mozambican state’s budget as allocated by the 
Minister of Finance. This funding source, with additional programme oversight from the Ministry 
of Finance, played a crucial role in GAPVU’s growth and longevity (Massingarela and Nhate 2006; 
Schubert 2015; Taimo and Waterhouse 2007). It has been mentioned that the funding came 
from money accrued and saved by the Government from food auctions that were part of food 
ration or subsidy schemes in previous food aid packages. External involvement came later in the 
form of technical assistance funding from the WB Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) 
programme and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund)  (Low et al, 1999; 
Massingarela and Nhate 2006; Schubert 2015). 
2.iii. GAPVU Programme Details and Timeline 
Logistically, GAPVU was a cash transfer implemented and funded by the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning. It was managed by Ms. Lopes, who was assisted by a local consultant, 
Prefuta Jayantira, who became the Director of GAPVU when Dr. Tomas Salomao (2015) was the 
Minister of Planning and Finance from 1994-1999 (World Bank 2013; Schubert 2015).  The cash 
transfer was targeted at specific groups of people who were living in states of absolute poverty 
in urban areas. These people could apply for the cash transfer at a local Ministry of Finance 
outreach office. Local community leaders also helped identify households that could benefit 
from GAPVU, and assisted with providing applications and documentation proving identity. After  
an application had been made, a home visit would sometimes occur and clinic nurses would 
screen malnourished children and pregnant women (Low et al . 1999). Once applicants had 
passed a means test, the beneficiaries would receive a monthly payment that at the time was 
roughly “7,500 MT6 per month for individuals not belonging to a family unit. For family units, the 
amount of the subsidy increase[d] to 12,500 MT or to 15,000 MT, depending on the number of 
family members”, and there was intention to readjust this to stay proportionate to minimum 
wage increases (Low et al 1999, p. 24; Massingharela and Nhate 2006; Taimo and Waterhouse 
2007). The amount was readjusted in 1993 and for the last time in 1996, to 32,000 MT for 
individuals and 51,000-64,000 MT for two and three person households, with an addition of 
8,000 MT per household member beyond three (Low et al. 1999). 
In terms of implementation, roughly 90% of beneficiaries would walk to their local 
GAPVU representation office to receive their monthly cash transfer. There were reports of 
interruptions in monthly payments for an average of 2.5 months at a time. This is significant as 
most GAPVU beneficiaries stayed with the programme for only 11 months (Datt et al. 1997). 
Towards 1996, more information became available about ghost beneficiaries and non-poor 
beneficiaries receiving the cash transfer, and some attribute this to GAPVU’s closing and move to 
INAS after 1997 (Alane 2015; Datt et al. 1997; Low et al. 1999).  
GAPVU’s organization within government also transformed over time. During the time of 
its creation in 1990, the food subsidy programme fell under the Ministry of Finance but was 
                                                                 
6 MT is the Mozambican currency, the Meticais 
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organized under the Ministry of State Administration, the Ministry of Health and the Secretariat 
of State for Social Action (SEAS). When GAPVU was reorganized after its first roll -out, its 
coordination role was moved from the Ministry of Finance and put directly under the SEAS. This 
body, an autonomous state institution, kept internal links with the Ministry of Health, made 
decisions on defining the selection criteria for beneficiaries, outlined the terms of reference and 
contractual conditions for GAPVU’s managerial team, and defined the objectives and functions 
for the advisory councils. Therefore, over time the role of the Ministry of Finance became 
confined to decisions on the budgetary allocation of state funding for GAPVU, and no longer an 
administrative role (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 11). 
2.iii.a. GAPVU Targeting 
GAPVU’s main beneficiary group was the urban poor, and this is different to today’s PSA 
after the 1998 expansion to rural areas (De Rooij 2015; Low et al. 1999). Targeting of GAPVU and 
the PSA portrays the Government’s original intention in creating this cash transfer to address the 
hardships faced by the urban poor who were capable of working but received salaries below 50% 
of minimum wage (Green 1991 cited in Low et al. 1999). Some scholars have attributed the 
urban bias of Frelimo as motivated by their desire to maintain links with non-Renamo urban 
populations (Sumich 2007). In addition, there was better capacity of the Government to reach 
out to urban areas versus rural areas dominated by Renamo (Antunes 2015; O’Laughlin 1996). 
The reason for GAPVUs urban roots could have also been influenced by the hardships felt by 
urban populations because of inflation and the strain on resources felt in urban areas due to 
mass internal migration to these areas (Salomao 2015). The overall outreach population included 
the following targeting of people with a salary below 50% of the minimum wage, which at the 
time was 58,800 MT ($20) who also were: 1. Elderly people, aged 60 years or more, and 2 years 
unemployed; 2. Chronically disabled people over 18 years old and 3. Families with 
undernourished pregnant women. The categories of single mothers with more than five children 
as well as chronically ill people were added in 1991 (Low et al. 1999, p. 15; Massingarela and 
Nhate 2006, p. 12; Schubert 1992, p. 111).  
These target populations were natural results of the civil war and internal displacement 
of people coming from the northern and central regions of Mozambique to urban areas such as 
Maputo, but were also justified through household surveys done on Maputo to identify 
characteristics of extreme poverty (Greany 2015; Low et al 1999). Because of the decade of war, 
77% of Maputo’s population were children, women and the elderly with only 23% being men of 
employable age (Schubert 1992, p. 11). Many of the 40,000-60,000 poor households in the 
urban centers and periphery were female-headed, as most men were either soldiers in the war 
or migrants to South Africa for work. The female-headed households with family members in 
South Africa, however, were not typically part of the 10,000 households that received a cash 
transfer, because work in South Africa provided an income over GAPVU limits (Schubert 1992, p. 
109).  
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2.iii.b. Key dates in GAPVU’s Timeline 
1988: Consultant team formed between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health and an 
external consultant (Schubert 1992) 
June 1990: Resolution passed by the Council of Ministers to officially create GAPVU (INAS 2013) 
September 1990: First cash transfers are rolled-out under the Programa Subsidio de Al imentos 
(PSA) to roughly 23 beneficiary households (Massingarela and Nhate 2006) 
May 27, 1991: Meeting with the Minister of Finance criticizing the low enrollment rate of GAPVU, 
thus giving the programme six months to reorganize with the help of Bernd Schubert, who 
received invitation to consult in Mozambique from the World Bank’s Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment programme (Low et al, 1999, p. 21; Schubert 2015) 
September 1991: GAPVU coverage reached 54,000 (Schubert 1993b, cited in Low et al , 1999, p. 
21) 
1992-1996: Period of reorganization and expansion phase of GAPVU (Low et al 1999, p. 5) 
1995-1996: Height of programme, 85,000-92,000 beneficiaries (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 
11; Hanlon 1996; (Tovela 1997, cited in Low et al. 1999, p. 6) 
1996-1998: Restructuring phase and major reorganization including move to INAS (Low et al . 
1999, p. 6) 
1997: GAPVU criticized for corruption and ‘ghost’ beneficiaries (Garcia and Moore 2012; Low et 
al. 1999). GAPVU closed and the PSA is moved to INAS, a newly created semi-autonomous 
institute under the Ministry of Women and Social Action (MMAS). It still receives its budget 
directly from the Ministry of Finance, as all Government departments do (Alane 2015; Ell is 2007 
cited in Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 283; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009; UNICEF 2014)  
2.iv. Rationales for GAPVU 
This section explores in detail three rationales given for Mozambique’s early adoption of 
cash transfer programmes and the creation of GAPVU against economic odds and restricted 
state capacity. These rationales were gathered through interviews, documentary analysis and 
review of literature. While neither one rationale can be attributed as the main source behind the 
creation of GAPVU, and at times they overlap, they have been split up into three themes. 
2.iv.a. A World Bank influenced concept related to the Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment programme: 
In the mid-1980s, Mozambique’s economy took several hard hits resulting from skills 
shortage post-independence and the civil war that flared up shortly thereafter. This war was 
catalyzed by the South African Apartheid Government’s and the Rhodesian Government’s 
strengthening of Renamo as a way to challenge the Frelimo socialist agenda (De Brito et al. 2014; 
Hanlon 1996; Salomao 2015). There are sources implying that the government, under Samora 
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Machel, went to Washington DC and approached the World Bank and IMF on their own to 
receive financial support. What resulted was that government agreed to the conditions of SAPs 
in order to get funding, and instituted these conditions through their own economic strategy 
(the PRE) that they had devised before approaching these institutions. The goal was to “regain 
economic health and [it] urge[d] sacrifices and belt-tightening at all levels” (Marshall 1990, p. 
41). Thus, the PRE was a Mozambican-crafted strategy that was endorsed and later influenced by 
the IMF and World Bank. It enabled membership into the Bretton Woods Institutions, a necessity 
at the time because other foreign donors made this membership a condition to receive financial  
support from them. 
Sources state that the negative impact of SAPs through the PRE were frankly discussed 
and outlined by the World Bank and the Government of Mozambique, foreshadowing that urban 
areas would take a hit from unemployment, from job cuts in the public sector, and the cutting of 
social service budgets (O’Laughlin 1996, p. 215). The main issue, that became a reality, was 
whether or not the Government had foreshadowed the social consequences of PRE. The 
intended economic ‘benefits’ of this programme were not realized to the desired extent of 
economic turnaround, and the social consequences were exacerbated to beyond the level that 
was predicted. The fact that Mozambique was still in a civil war during SAPs meant that a cut on 
government expenditure was felt more harshly because funds were being channeled into 
defense (Salomao 2015). These conditions led to an increase in poverty levels during the PRE, 
and around the world the burden of SAPs was starting to be felt on populations these 
programmes affected (O’Laughlin 1996).  
A couple years after the first set of structural adjustment programmes were 
implemented worldwide, the social implications on these economic recovery programmes were 
starting to come to light. Taube (1993, p. 166) noted that SAPs in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
criticized for increasing poverty levels and reducing access to social services, while having little 
focus on poor populations. Furthermore, SAPs had the consequences of “budget switching” or 
the reallocation of fiscal resources such as social expenditures and decreasing supply of social 
services (health and education) to boost up productive sectors and economic infrastructure; 
removal of subsidies on food and other consumer goods in addition to wage restraint, and 
weakening of purchasing power for low-income groups. This led to a rise in unemployment in the 
public sector and a strain on women and children because of increased agricultural workload and 
more work required to secure public services such as healthcare for households. At this time, the 
World Bank and the Government of Mozambique recognized that on average, the ‘urban poor 
and females’ were hit harder by adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stewart 1991, p. 
1854 cited in Taube 1993, p. 167). While budget switching did not occur everywhere, and the 
policies in some countries maintained social expenditures, in Mozambique SAPs directly 
impacted bills and practices that cut healthcare and education capacity, even against the will of 
the State.  
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In the late 1980s, the World Bank and IMF also began to realign their work to show more 
focus on poverty. In many countries, these institutions had begun to incorporate poverty and 
social policy into their negotiations for new adjustment programmes at country level. This came 
in the form of initiating ‘Social Action Funds’ with multi-sectoral anti-poverty programmes, 
including in some cases, public works schemes, nutrition support for children and pregnant 
women, and targeted food subsidies (Taube 1993). This was a period of time where Schubert 
(2015) noted that ‘welfare’ was not a popular term in development work. In addition, the 
traditional, often state implemented, social security systems and safety nets at community levels 
were breaking down due to social and economic change. Thus, while neoliberalism ushered in 
market and policy liberalization practices, it had yet given attention to social policy (Ferguson 
2009). Mkandawire (2010) notes that before neoliberalism, many African countries already had 
interest in strengthening social policy, and Mozambique was one of those newly independent 
countries to do so.   
As a consequence of information on the negative implications of SAPs and the World 
Bank’s growing focus on poverty, the World Bank created the ‘Social Dimensions of Adjustment’ 
programme in 1987, and acted as the supervising body of this assistance programme. It received 
funds from governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany and 
others such as the African Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 11; Salomao 2015; Taube 1993, p. 168) It was created 
to address the criticisms that the World Bank faced because of SAP’s negative consequences on 
the social standards of poor populations in developing countries (Taube 1993, p. 165). It is 
unclear if the conception of GAPVU predated SDA arrival in Mozambique, as the earliest report 
of SDA activity there dates back to the same time period, with several scholars attributing the 
cash transfer programme to having resulted from SDA (O’Laughlin 1996; Hanlon 1996; Selvester 
2012). It is worth noting, however, that GAPVU’s growth and reorganization in 1991 was one of 
the activities supported under the umbrella of SDA programmes (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, 
p. 3, 11). O’Laughlin (1996, p. 218) argues towards the origins of GAPVU from SDA and SAP 
influence because of its targeted nature, versus the inclination of the previously-socialist Frelimo 
tendency to nationalize all programmes. At this time, however, the adoption of SAPs already 
meant that the government could not promote nationalized or egalitarian-like programmes, and 
were confined to taking care of the most vulnerable. O’Laughlin (1996) attributes the adoption 
of a cash transfer programme to the World Bank’s take on Sen’s entitlements and increased 
purchasing power concerns, by providing direct nutritional support via food aid, but this claim is 
not widely found.  
Schubert (2015) notes that in late 1990, the SDA programme put out calls to its bilateral 
partners for funding of programmes that could fall under the parameters of the SDA mandate, 
one area specifically being the World Bank’s desire to help those who had lost jobs because of 
SAPs. The German development agency (GTZ) put out a call for interest for programmes in 
places affected by SAPs such as Mozambique. While social welfare programmes and cash 
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transfers were not popular nor favorable as development programmes at that time, Schubert 
(2015) had appealed to GTZ that Mozambique had a cash transfer programme already. He 
proposed an evaluation of this programme towards its capacity build-up and growth under GTZ’s 
call for programmes in line with SDA. Schubert’s position as GAPVU’s first external technical 
consultant was therefore funded on the down-low by GTZ and his entrance into Mozambique to 
GAPVU was made possible through SDA’s advocacy for this programme (Low et al. 1999, p. 5) . 
It is worth noting that while an urban cash transfer had been one of the programmes 
advocated by the World Bank’s Food Security Strategy for Mozambique in 1989, this specific 
recommendation was of “improved coverage of the existing ration system and indirect transfers 
through subsidies on inferior goods, such as yellow maize” (Low et al, 1999 p. 5). As portrayed 
through Schubert’s (2015) description of the funding source for GAPVU and through Low et al. 
(1999, p. 5), by the following year, however, consultants were suggesting that a targeted, not 
indirect, cash transfer would be more effective than the poorly functioning ration schemes. In 
addition, there were many reasons for the failure of the food rationing schemes, including the 
privatization and state-roll back pressure of SAPs that cut salaries of civil servants administer ing 
social services, thus weakening capacity to implement certain social programmes (O’Laughlin 
1996, p. 219). Therefore, the World Bank’s indirect cash transfer suggestion was not GAPVU and 
its ration scheme plan was not adopted. 
Although the Government of Mozambique should take main credit for the inception, 
funding and implementation of this programme, international financial institutions did play their  
part in the early days of this programme. For example, Bernd Schubert (2015) has pointed out 
that the continuation of this programme was made possible after the pilot phase through 
funding from the World Bank’s Social Dimensions of Adjustment programme and the Bank’s 
desire to mitigate the effects of adjustment on social life. In addition, Low et al. (1999, pg. 4, 41) 
state that because of the negative social consequences of SAPs, “once [GAPVU] begun, there 
was pressure to show success, especially given the lackluster performance of most other SDA-
funded initiatives.” Thus, the BWIs played a role in catalyzing GAPVU and cash transfer 
programmes because of the socially harmful effects of structural adjustment, through the riff 
between the World Bank and the IMF on outlooks of the failing food rationing programmes, and 
later through financial support to technical expertise to grow the programmes successfully.  
Interestingly, two sources from the World Bank (Fernandes 2015; Garcia and Moore 
2012, p. 277) have consensus that cash transfers in Mozambique started in 1993 after food 
subsidies for commodities were removed, and GAPVU was used as an emergency programme, 
not a permanent one. While they do not attribute the World Bank to starting them, 1993 was a 
period when GAPVU already had scaled its beneficiary numbers and kept growing, and this 
section has pointed out how this could be because of technical assistance funding given by the 
World Bank’s own SDA programme. In conclusion, data suggesting inception of GAPVU from the 
World Bank and its SDA programme are limited, however, they did have a role in ensuring that 
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GAPVU continued and grew over the next few years. The World Bank’s relationship with 
Mozambican cash transfers will be addressed in the next chapter. 
2.iv.b. From food aid to cash transfers-food ration replacement strategy: 
Food aid in the form of auctions, rations and subsidy programmes, had been the 
predominant form of aid and hunger assistance programming in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 20th 
century (Ellis 2012; Garcia and Moore 2012; Schubert 2015). Food aid in Mozambique was a 
significant programme utilized by foreign donors to address difficulties created by the war and 
the failure of state farms and agricultural cooperatives enacted under Frelimo’s socialist agenda  
(O’Laughlin 1996, p. 210). Marshall (1990, p. 31) stated that by 1987, food aid dominated food 
markets alongside private production, and was up to $200 million. By the Frelimo Fifth Congress 
in mid-1989, 7.7 million people out of the country’s 15 million were partially or fully dependent 
on food aid (ration and subsidy programmes), a significant number when considering that food 
rations officially stopped in 1988 (Marshall 1990; O’Laughlin 1996). O’Laughlin (1996, p. 200) 
comments that during the 1980s, the NSA (Novo Sistema de Abastecimento)7 was integral to 
poor and non-poor households in Maputo as a food rationing scheme of everyday subsistence. It 
was thought that this system would be continued as a safety net for urban households when 
SAPs started in 1987 and while the World Bank was becoming concerned about SAPs effects on 
urban poverty in Africa. The food subsidy systems, however, were terminated in March 1988, 
most likely resulting from the clash between the World Bank and IMF as previously discussed.  
The NSA was terminated in 1993, when GAPVU was already in place and growing. Schubert 
(2015) noted that in Mozambique and many other places, food subsidy programmes rarely 
reached the poor, who did not have any money to buy the maize or other commodities that 
were being subsidized. 
 Subsidies on foods such as maize meal, rice, pasta, beans, sugar, and oil, had been a 
“pillar of social policy for urban dwellers” over the years and the main form of social  protection 
(Marshall 1990, p. 31). Schubert (2015) described how starting in the mid 20th century, American 
food aid used to be auctioned in Mozambique and the money went to a government account. 
The termination of these programmes resulted in a harsh removal of an urban survival system 
and left urban workers and dwellers unable to purchase food that was available at higher prices. 
As stated in the previous section, there were suggestions that the new cash transfers 
programme (GAPVU) were part of the package advocated within the World Bank and IMF for 
food distribution programmes in urbans areas consisting of internally displaced refugees from 
the war. These programmes are noted to have been met by widespread protests in different 
spheres of Mozambican society, and the cash transfer suggested was an ‘indirect income 
transfer programme’, and was not implemented. The reasons given were that food aid, versus an 
alternative such as cash, did not have the ability to enable people to make small investments or 
                                                                 
7 Translates to: New Provisioning System 
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engage with formal insurance schemes. In addition, medical care and transportation could not 
be covered by food schemes (Schubert 1992, cited in Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 10) . 
An interesting point about GAPVU’s PSA in discussion of food aid programmes 
transitioning to cash transfer programmes comes from the PSA’s naming convention. Low et al. 
(1999, p. 8) highlight that the official title of the ‘food subsidy programme’ (programa subsidio 
de alimentos) is unclear, because there were never direct implications, yet only assumptions, 
that the cash transfer would go only to purchasing additional food. These assumptions were 
based on the fact that the PSA came at the time when the food subsidy programmes were 
terminated and therefore is perceived as a politically-motivated substitute (Low et al. 1999, p. 8). 
Additionally, another assumption is because of an increased awareness of the rising costs of food 
due to inflation and the cut-off of subsidies. These all resulted in rising urban food insecurity, 
thus it is assumed that GAPVU and the PSA were created to address these conditions. There is no 
evidence, however, stating that beneficiaries were encouraged to spend the cash on food, and 
only some external studies imply that means testing and other data for this programme 
surrounded caloric intake (Datt et al 1997; Low et al. 1999). As mentioned, a justification for 
replacing food subsidy programmes is that they did not address other needs of urban dwellers in 
ways that a cash transfer programme could and did, such as purchasing power  (even to buy 
subsidised food) and capabilities of unemployed urban groups living in states of destitution. 
While one study mentions that the PSA was supposed to target populations in such states of 
poverty that they did not have enough purchasing power to access urban food ration 
programmes, the urban food ration programmes were terminated by the time the PSA was 
implemented but at any rate were both Government implemented programmes (Schubert 1990, 
cited in Low et al, 1999, p. 8). 
In an interview, Schubert (2015) clarified that from his understanding, the programme 
was called the PSA because the funds that were given out as cash transfers were actually saved 
up by the Government from the previous food auctions. Therefore, the PSA got its name from 
funds diverted away from food subsidies, and this could explain why today its name does not 
necessarily imply food subsidy cash transfers. Further evidence for this statement has yet to be 
gathered, however, it does resonate with known information that the Government provided, 
and still today provides a majority of the cash to beneficiaries of this programme. This 
explanation also resonates with the Government’s stance on finding an innovative social 
assistance solution for the urban poor during the war, using available resources and out-of-the-
box financial streams at a time when a majority of the government resources were channeled to 
the army or significantly constrained by SAPs (Salomao 2015).  
2.iv.c. The Government’s socialism-influenced response to mitigating the effects of 
Structural Adjustment- an economic and social hardship strategy: 
Poverty in Mozambique was not only a direct result of the civil war and structural 
adjustment, but a condition that had predated and persisted before and after Mozambique’s 
independence from the Portuguese colonial government. Thus, poverty, equality, and the end of 
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exploitation were major pillars of Frelimo’s political agenda, especially as a firstly egalitarian and 
then Marxist-Leninist influenced socialist regime (Nwafor 1983; Schubert 1992). The decision for  
Mozambique to adopt socialism post-independence was influenced by the establishment of 
socialist-supported governments around Africa in the 1960’s-1970s (Mkandawire 2010). Herbst 
(1990, p. 951) states that this was because of the “hierarchically organized and centralized, and 
economically intrusive government systems” that weak and insecure African governments 
inherited from colonialists. In addition, centralized power enabled these new governments to 
have a stronger hold on the economy during infancy periods of the new governments. Socialism 
enabled many governments to provide resources to their citizens, such as jobs, access to 
government work, subsidies on goods, and social services. In Mozambique, socialism was 
officially confirmed by Frelimo’s Third Congress in 1977 and the creation of a ten-year plan to 
promote central planning, the Plano Prospectivo Indicativo (PPI) adopted in 1980 (Hanlon 1996, 
p. 96). Despite difficult circumstances post-independence such as skills shortage and a loss of 
$600 million due to UN sanctions against Rhodesia, this period welcomed economic recovery, 
doubled export numbers, industrial production rising by 16%, a steady Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and social services being expanded rapidly within Mozambique (Hanlon 1996, p. 89). The 
trend of the 1960s and 1970s of development through state intervention in the economy, 
interestingly, was endorsed by the World Bank (Herbst 1990; Mkandawire 2010). 
Frelimo’s social policy and poverty strategy  
 Social policy was a main facet of Frelimo’s socialist ‘planned economy’ standpoint, as 
indicated in their initial moves to nationalize education and healthcare, and provide general food 
subsidies (Hanlon 1996; Nwafor 1983; O’Laughlin 1996, p. 204). This nationalization of social 
services was a stark contrast from the Portuguese colonial rule, where little resources were 
devoted to social services (World Bank 1995). The nationalization of social services, however, 
was under attack during the civil war and migration as well as devastation of infrastructure 
weakened the social services project. Hanlon (1996, p. 5) stated how the civil war:  
“was no mindless violence. Renamo and its South African and US strategists had clear goals: the 
aim was to destroy the gains of independence and, almost Pol Pot-like, to target the better-off, 
thus building a base among the poorest and the most backward. Because health and education 
were the main causes of Frelimo’s popularity, schools and health facilities were particular targets; 
students, teachers and nurses were kidnapped or killed, and in some cases hospital patients were 
massacred, so that people would be afraid to provide or use social services.” 
To add to this description, one-third of all the rural health units were closed or destroyed, 
leaving roughly 60% of the population without health facilities and about 70% of the primary 
school network was shut down during the civil war (World Bank 1995, p. 2).  
Frelimo’s ten-year prospective plan intended to defeat underdevelopment throughout 
the decade of the 1980s. The civil war period interrupted this and discredited the socialist 
system, alienating a majority of the rural population from Frelimo (O’Laughlin 1996, p. 210). 
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There were even efforts to create consumer cooperatives in communal villages to ensur e that 
basic necessities were offered even in remote rural areas, as part of Frelimo’s view on how 
distribution should be organized (Nwafor 1983, p. 61; O’Laughlin 1996, p. 208). These decisions 
made by Frelimo point to its emphasis on welfare, provision of basic needs, and equality as 
central to the party’s beliefs. Economic growth and development could not be achieved without 
a reduction of exploitation: a clear shift from the viewpoint of the Portuguese colonial authority 
of an extractive state with social services only made available to Black Mozambicans who were 
being groomed as ‘elites’ by the Portuguese (Kaleidoscopio 2015; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 
2009; p. 2). Frelimo’s efforts to tackle inequality and promote growth was through 
redistribution, price controls, subsidies on staples, free education and free healthcare for many. 
These efforts, however, did not get rid of the poverty levels growing in Maputo at that time. 
Government programmes had leakages and notable exclusions for internally displaced persons 
who settled on the urban peripheries. O’Laughlin (1996, p. 209) notes that poverty hit those 
“without access to income from a regular wage-employment or cultivable land; those without 
money to pay the entry quota for a consumer cooperative… many of these were women-
divorced, widowed, unmarried mothers- without education or experience to move into formal 
wage employment.” These are the same groups that would later be targeted as GAPVU 
beneficiaries.  
Flederman (1993, p. 125-126) adds to this when stating: 
 “Since Independence, the Mozambican Government has demonstrated a high level of 
political will to generate social services policy, backed by resource allocation, for the poorest 
groups- a record unique in Southern Africa. (Green, 1993) The water supply programme and 
vaccination campaign are direct Government services, the outcome of policy and resource 
allocation for the very poor, especially for women and children…Commitment to a social 
safety net resulted in the coordinated efforts of a number of ministries to nurture the 
conception of the GAPVU cash transfers programme and to remove the red tape once it 
expanded.”  
The poverty reduction strategy of the Government by the late 1980s was four-fold, and 
was carried over into the post-War Reconstruction Plan (Salomao 2015; Schubert 1992): 
employment, food aid, cash for work programmes, and GAPVU. GAPVU became the biggest 
programme and most effective programme with the longest enduring lifespan (Schubert 1992, 
pg. 111). It is noted that the Government initially viewed the cash transfer programme as a 
poverty alleviation tool and not a tool that would result in widespread poverty reduction, and 
this is seen in its packaging with other poverty alleviation programmes that were carried over to 
the Reconstruction Plan (Boletim 1993, cited in Low et al, p. 7). While different sources suggest 
that the creation of GAPVU was in line with Frelimo’s socialist tendencies to create equality and 
safety nets, other scholars such as O’Laughlin (1996, p. 219) imply that the government did not 
have the capacity to provide safety nets for even a majority of urban destitute households. 
Therefore, GAPVU can also be read as a ‘political smokescreen’ in response to doubts of the 
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effectiveness of adopting SAPs and of the damaging social consequences of SAPs and civil war for 
people who were able to work and who had previously felt social justice through the language of 
socialism.  
It was also said that by the time of reconstruction, the Ministry of Planning and Finance’s 
Poverty Alleviation Unit began to review the safety net system in order to reorient its goals from 
disaster preparedness to permanent systems for vulnerable rural groups (World Bank 1995, p. 
2). The incorporation of rural areas under GAPVU came in the successive years, and was a focal 
point of GAPVU’s reorganization in 1997. To aid the Government-initiated plan on expanding 
permanent poverty programmes, the budget for social services increased by 43% in real terms, 
yet this was still lower than the per capita expenditure for social services of the early 1980s 
(World Bank 1995, p. 2). This aspect, combined with other examples of social policy within the 
party, is important to highlight as explanation for Mozambique’s early adoption of a cash 
transfer programme through Frelimo government leadership. As mentioned, these programmes 
were not socially favorable around the world at that time and were difficult lobby for, fund, and 
administer under the confines of neoliberal ideology and policy (Devereux 2013; Midgley 2013; 
Schubert 2015).   
Political shift and state autonomy 
As a member of Frelimo since the 1980s, Dr. Salomao (2015) described in an interview 
that from Independence, the socialist ideology had been present in Frelimo but the change in 
political stance to open up to capitalist development came about during the war due to 
constraints, and sentiments that perhaps the socialist economic model was not appropriate for 
growth at that time. Salomao (2015) stated that the adoption of capitalism, which was ushered 
in by the decision to become a member of the Bretton Woods Institutions, happened while 
Samora Machel, Mozambique’s first president and an architect of Frelimo’s socialist position, 
was still president. Machel had also felt that socialism was not working, and he had taken a trip 
to Washington DC. to meet with President Ronald Regan and tell him that Mozambique would 
approach the IMF and World Bank for support. This was a decision motivated by the war, and 
the need to survive. This event also goes against many political sentiments that Samora Machel 
died clinging onto the socialist mentality.  
Therefore, it is evident that Frelimo did have a political shift from the time of 
independence to the time of GAPVU, which can be seen in the move from basic needs provision 
and state-centric development to the acceptance of capitalist development through SAPs, 
“under which the state was charged to protect only the most vulnerable” (O’Laughlin 1996, 201). 
The overarching view of the role of the state during the time of neoliberalism was to weaken the 
state in favor of privatization and liberalization of the market (Evans 1995; Herbst 1990; Jinadu 
2010; Mkandawire 2010; Weiss 2010). While one of the motivations for structural adjustment 
was the perception of weak, corrupt state structures especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, neoliberal  
institutions had been reluctant to clearly outline the role of the state under long-term structural 
adjustment, or give an idea of what the state should look like after structural adjustment (Herbst 
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1990, p. 952-953). This lack of strategy to specifically determine the role of the state or even 
weakly describe it during SAPs enabled the Government of Mozambique to dictate and maintain 
their own strategy within the confines of neoliberal policy, and define their ‘no go’ zones in 
terms of neoliberal adoption, with some failures to defend their autonomy such as in the case of 
the liberalization of the cashew market (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Salomao 2015).  
Even during structural adjustment through the PRE, Hanlon (1996, p. 92) stated that still 
in 1987, “there was no major privatization and subsidies to state industry continued; the urban 
food ration system was maintained; key prices remained controlled and the social sector 
remained state-controlled.” The BWI’s were not pleased with this level of state-control under 
the PRE and PRES, but they accepted these plans that the Government had created. They 
acknowledged that the Government still adopted many of the policies outlined by BWI’s while 
protecting areas crucial to their existence, as described by the Finance Minister (Hanlon 1996). 
For example, Dr. Salomao (2015) insisted how the Government did not privatize all  areas, 
because some areas such as “railway companies, energy, mobile companies, TDM, water, LAM 
(national airlines)” had no need for the private sector, and no others wanted to be involved; thus 
certain sectors were left to the Government or protected by it. Because of the Government’s 
ability to choose “which ones to follow and which ones to ignore”, in terms of BWI policies, 
Hanlon (1996, p. 93) states that this ‘selectivity’ accounted for the only period of growth in 15 
years.   
While it is noted that the “IMF finally asserted its dominance with the agreement in 1990 
of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which marked the adoption of the full neoliberal  
package- privatizations, free international trade, the end of price controls and the cheap urban 
food ration, sharp cuts in government spending and credit restrictions,” this is the same time 
that GAPVU started (Hanlon 1996, p. 93-94). In an interview with Eleasara Antunes (2015), who 
had lived in Maputo during the civil war and who is the Director of the Gender and Social 
Protection Unit of the Embassy of the Netherlands in Mozambique, she described that the start 
of cash transfers in Mozambique were initiated after Structural Adjustment Programmes started 
in the late 1980s. From her view, this was a means for Government to buffer increasing inflation 
(Antunes 2015).  Furthermore, she detailed how the time during GAPVU’s creation was: 
“a complicated moment in the 1980s, where the first president (Machel) had just died, and 
there was political interest to provide a minimum for the increasing urban poverty. Many were 
living in flats with 20 people, and there were no jobs. Thus, the motivation of the Government 
was to use social protection at an opportune time to respond to civil riots or to mitigate c ivil 
unrest; this trend of governments using cash transfers to respond to inflation and poverty 
increases because of SAPs can be found in literature in other places too” (Antunes 2015).  
As previously addressed, the trend governments using cash transfers to respond to 
inflation-induced poverty was also seen in Latin America. While the impact of SAPs on the 
economy had been weak, as team leader for the reconstruction plan Dr. Salomao (2015) 
described that government had created their own strategies, yet needed World Bank support to 
Teresa N. Le- 441288 MA, Development Studies Research Report 2016 
 
45 
 
organize a consultative conference to present the reconstruction plan from 1992-1994 and scale 
efforts. This process occurred because Mozambique, as a member of the World Bank since the 
mid-1980s, had been paying contributions to the World Bank. Therefore, Salomao (2015) 
portrayed that there was a package available (of Mozambique’s contributions) from the World 
Bank, and allocation would be made by the World Bank for infrastructure, roads, etc. This 
process clearly shows that while the heavy hand of the World Bank existed during the height of 
neoliberalism, the Government still maintained authority over decision-making processes in 
addition to where and how (financially or non-financially) it wanted involvement of the World 
Bank in certain sectors. This will later be seen in the Fernandes (2015) description of World Bank 
involvement via Government request in social protection in Mozambique today. This is also seen 
in Salomao’s (2015) description of the World Bank providing funds for public works programmes 
within the Government strategized, and technically funded via Government contributions to 
World Bank, reconstruction plan, and more so the Government implementing these programmes 
directly. These examples of government leadership and activity simultaneous to neoliberal 
efforts to ‘roll-back’ and confine the state portray why the state had such an interest in creating 
its own cash transfer programme. The Government deliberately used cash transfers as both a 
poverty and solidarity addressing mechanism, and continued exercising of its own welfare to its 
citizens as a buffer against external interventions exacerbating poverty. Despite political shifts 
and adoption of capitalism and neoliberal policies, Frelimo remained and has remained 
supportive of these programmes because cash transfers have uniquely fit into the State’s own 
political ideologies and vulnerability-targeted plans. Despite claims that the Government was 
confined because of SAPs and this lead to Mozambique being a neoliberalism ‘success story’, 
more attention needs to be attributed to the fact that the Government selected areas for 
neoliberal intervention and areas where external actors would not play a role. This Government 
selectivity is often ignored as a ‘success’ factor for post-war, post SAP economic growth in 
Mozambique as the success is often attributed to liberalisation practices. 
2.v. Conclusion 
Development experts such as Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009, p.2) state that: 
“Post war, the Government’s top priorities were to re-establish security and rebuild 
infrastructure. However, political and economic liberalization in the 1990s saw tight caps on 
state spending. Poverty was so widespread and deep that there seemed to be little scope for 
special consideration of the ‘poorest of the poor’…except for ad-hoc initiatives, such as the 
food subsidy programme for the poor and unable to work”. 
 To what extent were social cash transfers ad-hoc towards war reconstruction, or were 
they in fact part of the Government’s continued desire to provide social services for all, including 
the poorest of the poor? Additionally, other claims state that neoliberal policy and attempts to 
weaken (socialist) state autonomy meant that the Government was restricted from providing 
support on national levels, and had to resort to only focusing on the most vulnerable groups 
Teresa N. Le- 441288 MA, Development Studies Research Report 2016 
 
46 
 
(O’Laughlin 1996). In many ways, the story of GAPVU and more so its continuation as the PSA 
and PSSB today challenges the views of Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009). It is evident that 
structural adjustment implemented under civil war conditions clearly influenced and perhaps 
catalyzed GAPVU because of the negative consequences on society leading to Government 
devising survival strategies within budget constraints (De Rooij 2015; Low et al. 1999, p.4). 
Neoliberalism’s impact in other places and even Mozambique was one of privatization of social 
services, cuts on public sector salaries resulting in weak capacity to implement public services, 
and fiscal restraints de-capacitating state structures (Mkandawire 2010). Yet still in this time, the 
Mozambican state created Sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth cash transfer programme and one of the 
oldest non-contributory schemes. This chapter has provided ample evidence that it was out of 
the Government’s will, political ideology, and desperation because of economic, political and 
social crises to create a programme of giving money directly to people as a form of welfare and 
solidarity during tough times. GAPVU is said to have been the only ‘fully functioning’ social 
programme in Mozambique and the only programme providing a safety net and poverty 
alleviation to urban populations, from the period starting just before the end of the civil war and 
to today (Datt et al. 1997, p.2; Low et al 1999).  
What made Mozambique different from other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa who went 
through periods of 1. independence from colonialism; 2. war or economic instability; or 3. 
structural adjustment and neoliberalism? Schubert (2015) detailed that from his eight visits and 
consultancies to Mozambique for GAPVU between 1991-1993, he could see that GAPVU “got off 
under all restrictions of SAPs despite skepticism of Government and development experts 
existing, because it was not a mainstream programme.” What clearly made a difference for  the 
case of GAPVU was the socialist aspirations, welfare and solidarity approach from the State in 
addition to the clear role of and continued engagement of the Ministry of Finance from the early 
days (Greany 2015; Schubert 2015). In addition, an important take away of this programme is 
the clear commitment from the government to its most vulnerable citizens. Over time, this has 
endured through its ability to boost the livelihoods of the urban poor and today rural 
populations too. GAPVU as a programme had its organizational flaws and in later years was 
marred with corruption charges and weak coverage.  Its challenges could have also been the 
odds it faced through its ‘imbedding in a strategy of liberalization’ (PRE and PRES period) that did 
not adequately address the structural issues of pervasive poverty, a challenge that Mozambique 
still confronts today (O’Laughlin 1996, p. 200). Greany (2015), a development professional in 
Maputo, stated in an interview that Mozambique’s programme is unique because it grew from a 
‘pity hand out’ during the war to an impactful social protection programme that is focused on 
the idea of investment in people. This will be fully elaborated through tracing the history of 
GAPVU to the PSA and PSSB from 1997-present.  While the roots of this urban cash transfer have 
several implied sources, what matters is the legacy that was created out of times of civil war and 
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neoliberal constraints to the implementing source, the state. The successive programmes born 
out of the legacy of the Government-initiated programme will be covered in the next chapter.  
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3. Chapter Three: the Second Wave of Cash Transfers 
3.i. Introduction: Continued social cash transfer programmes 
After the start of GAPVU, Mozambique lavished in a period of rapid increase in beneficiary 
outreach for GAPVU and increased external development aid to support war reconstruction and 
anti-poverty programmes. What will be addressed next is how in spite of GAPVU’s closure as an 
office in 1997 and increased space and authority realised by external development actors 
between 1997 and now, deeming Mozambique a ‘development darling’, the Government has 
maintained and grown its own social cash transfer spread of programmes since then. What this 
signifies is a continuation of its social welfare ideology in addition to a continuation of emphasis 
on government funding of cash transfers. Over the same period of time, the policy space of 
social cash transfers at the Sub-Saharan Africa level changed. While these programmes used to 
be stigmatized as ‘hand out’ interventions, they are now increasingly touted as transformative 
poverty reduction programmes and investments in people’s productive capabilities. The new 
view of social cash transfers was ushered in with increased donor and international community 
attention and monetary support, inside and outside of Mozambique.  
Chapter two argued that GAPVU began and persisted under the adverse conditions of 
weak economic capacity and structural adjustment efforts to ‘roll -back’ the state.  These 
conditions did not disable or restrict the role of the state to the extent that is implied when 
Mozambique is called a neoliberalism ‘success story’.  Neoliberalism did, however, influence the 
political will seen by the state to provide for the poorest of the poor, a moral issue that is 
witnessed in Frelimo’s ideology from its earliest days too. This chapter will present the history 
and logistics of Mozambique’s expanded social cash transfer agenda from 1997 until today, while 
arguing that the Government backing of GAPVU from 1990 until today has remained constant 
and overall consistent. This positioning of the Government at the center of its cash transfers 
programmes has been integral to the survival and emphasis of social cash transfers in one of the 
poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. What was once perhaps motivated through civil war-
time efforts to build solidarity, political support and assistance against the shocks of SAPs, has 
grown into a long-term, state-centric social protection floor within Mozambique’s social action 
sector. Moreover, the State has maintained a continuous position supportive of cash transfers, 
throughout a time when the rest of the social protection trajectory dramatically shifted from 
wide skepticism of anti-neoliberal handouts, to a mainstream programming within development 
sectors. The government’s solid position on cash transfers, pioneering before most countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, is seen in fiscal control and direct oversight over programme growth. Despite 
other actors getting involved in Mozambique’s social protection sector only when social 
protection was no longer marred by the development sector’s distaste towards welfare transfers 
pre-2000, the Government has maintained its central, supportive role in these programmes.  
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3.ii. Social protection and cash transfer history from 1997-present 
  The mid-1990s saw a period of reconstruction, state funds being channeled towards 
emergency relief, and growth of external dependency on foreign aid. SAPs continued during this 
time, with an emphasis on privatization of state enterprises, restrictions on government 
spending and the overall role of the state in economic affairs, justified as strategies to curb 
inflation and promote growth.  Economically, adherence to SAPs did result in positive economic 
growth at an average rate of 7% in the late 1990s, and gradually government resources were 
shifted from military activities to education, health, agriculture and social action (Massingarela 
and Nhate 2006, p. 7). This is different from the situation of the rest of Africa, which saw the 
lowest period of economic growth because of SAPs, While these neoliberal policies were 
supposed to remove state ‘distortions’ of markets and yield economic growth via new private 
capital investment, the reality was of increasing inflation and inequality (Ferguson 2009, p. 11). 
Politically, in 1994 Mozambique held its first ever multi-party elections, with Frelimo remaining 
as the front-runner in all elections even until today (Hanlon and Smart 2008; Waterhouse and 
Lauriciano 2009, p. 5). Much of the country remained in situations of absolute poverty and it was 
“accepted that there ha[d] not been any significant improvement in the nutritional conditions in 
the rural areas despite peace” (Hanlon 1996, p. 3). 
3.ii.a. The role of the Mozambican state in the mid-1990s 
 There are polarized views on what type of role the Mozambican state had in economic 
affairs at this time. Many argue that because of the strong hand of the BWIs in Mozambique, and 
the need for financial assistance from external sources, the role of the state a weak one because 
of the prolonged conditions of structural adjustment’s ‘anti-statist’ agenda (Ferguson 2009; 
Hanlon 1996; Hanlon and Smart 2008). The rise in foreign aid over this period resulted in a 
situation whereby in 1996, 65% of the GDP was made up of foreign aid (Greany 2015; Hanlon 
and Smart 2008). Because of the historically weak financial performance of Mozambique, the 
decade of civil war and on top of it all, the financial demands of the reconstruction plan, it was 
quoted by the Head of Agronomy at Universidad Eduardo Mondlane, Firmino Mucavele, that 
“when you lack capacity, you tend to accept what outsiders say and you come to believe it. We 
sing the IMF songs, even though we don’t understand what the words mean” (Hanlon 1996, p. 
113). Another description of the situation showed that “in contrast to what we would like to 
think, the rulers of Africa are not the various African states...The bosses of Africa and of 
Mozambique are the World Bank and the IMF…Their programme is to integrate Africa into a 
system of economic neocolonialism which takes no account of people. What counts is the free 
market; its god is money” (Hanlon 1996, p.1). 
 The opposite and lesser-expressed view is of a not only present but actively involved 
state, against the odds of neoliberal attempts to confine the state in order to implement free 
market practices. This type of role was seen in Frelimo remaining focused on assisting 
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Mozambican citizens through social services. This view supports that the conditions outlined by 
the BWIs did not remove nor weaken the role of the state, outside of and despite budgetary 
constraints and increased influence of donor agencies. As mentioned, some scholars highlight 
that the state was an essential and necessary actor in creating the economic and regulatory 
conditions by which neoliberal state roll-back and privatization activities could occur (De Renzio 
and Hanlon 2007; Jinadu 2010; Pitcher 2002; Weiss 2010). The view in support of a strong and 
autonomous state capacity is illustrated by a statement made by the Frelimo Central Committee 
on May 10, 1996, that: 
“Reducing inflation must be balanced with economic growth in a way that does not result in 
major suffering by Mozambicans. The international financial institutions must take into 
consideration the concrete need of Mozambique to reconstruct. Macroeconomic policies lose 
all legitimacy when they inevitably degrade the lives of citizens, reducing them to absolute 
misery… The state cannot give up its capacity as regulator of the economy” (Hanlon 1996, p. 
134).  
The neoliberal idea of a small role of the state was therefore not supported by Frelimo and most 
Mozambicans at all levels, despite accepting SAPs and its conditions. As mentioned, during the 
time of initial SAPs negotiations, the Frelimo government was insistent on selecting where 
adjustment policies were applicable and what areas the Government intended to protect from 
SAPs (Salomao 2015). By the late 1990s, it was not a situation of ‘privatisation vs. state 
enterprises’ and the privatization agenda for certain areas was actually supported by Frelimo and 
by entities in society, too. There was also clear recognition that a stronger state would create the 
environment for the growth of the private sector (Hanlon 1996, p. 101). Lastly, there was 
agreement from UNICEF and UNDP that “for most of these public services there is no alternative 
basic supplier to the state either now or in the foreseeable future” (Adedji et al., 1995 cited in 
Hanlon 10996, p. 101). 
While Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009) state that at this time the poverty agenda 
received increased attention, this depends on how one views Frelimo’s emphasis on equality as 
synonymous to or outside of a poverty agenda. It is apparent, however, that the increase in 
foreign donors and development agencies within Mozambique and their poverty agendas had 
shaped the Government’s political view of poverty as a growth strategy. The first National 
Poverty Assessment was carried out in 1997, and showed that roughly 69% of the population 
was living in poverty, while the second National Poverty Assessment in 2002 indicated that the 
level had dropped to 54% of the population (Massingarela and Nhate 2006, p. 7-8).  
3.ii.b. The End of GAPVU 
The period of 1996-1998 is described as the third stage of GAPVU’s evolution, whereby 
the program received an initial restructuring and subsequent reorganization to a new area of 
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government. This was a result of the numerous evaluations done on the first few cycles of the 
cash transfer programme. In 1995, despite budget and human capacity constraints, the Ministry 
of Finance ordered a large-scale beneficiary survey. The goal of this survey was to find ways to 
reduce the cost of the programme and justify its impact, amidst negative claims against the 
programme. The result of this evaluation and a few others was a push to reform Government’s 
policy on the selection of targeted groups (UAP/UUP/MPF 1997 cited in Low et al. 1999, p. 17). A 
distinction was then made between those who could and could not help themselves by means of 
obtaining work, with a focus on the latter when the programme was restarted under INAS. INAS 
was created on the 10th of September 1997 through a decree from the Council of Ministers 
(Decreto no. 28/97) and was responsible for social service delivery (INAS 2013, p. 1). Through 
INAS, the PSA continued and other cash transfer programmes were initiated. One of them was a 
pilot cash-for-work programme to provide income for women who had previously received the 
GAPVU transfer but did not fall under the new eligibility criteria  because they were capable of 
obtaining work. In addition, the revived programme provided 5.8 times more money than the 
previous PSA cash transfer administered by GAPVU (Low et al. 1999; Massingarela and Nhate 
2006 p. 18).  
After the evaluations of GAPVU, between 1996-1997 the GAPVU office that was started 
under the Ministry of Finance and Planning was officially shut down and therefore “GAPVU was 
abolished” by Government (Low et al. 1999, p.6). There are numerous reasons for why the Office 
was shut down, including corruption allegations and the discovery of numerous ‘ghost 
beneficiaries’ (Devereux and Pelham 2005 cited and Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 280; Low et al. 
1999, p.6; Massingharela and Nhate 2006; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). A second reason 
suggests it was closed in response to internal and external pressures reacting to the programme 
evaluations. Lastly, there were claims in an interview with the architect of the post-war 
reconstruction plan, Dr. Salomao (2015), that the reconstruction programme had come to a 
close by 1997 and that the targeted beneficiaries of the cash transfer (urban migrants displaced 
by war) were encouraged to return home to rural areas by then. Dr. Salomao (2015) elaborated 
that, “At some point, if you are in peace, you are undertaking rehabilitation of roads and people 
are encouraged to go back [home]. This program could encourage people to live on this subsidy, 
so the programme ended.” This statement has hints of the ‘dependency view’ or ‘handouts view’  
that was an on-and-off view of different Ministers of Finance throughout time, and will be 
touched on later in this chapter. This statement, however, does not elaborate on why GAPVU 
and the PSA were continued under INAS, but it could be that the new targeting metrics 
prevented capable workers from staying unemployed and living off of transfers. 
Massingarela and Nhate (2006, p. 17) recall that, 
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“Before the change of mandate and name of the institution, consultations were made to gather 
the views of the many stakeholders in Mozambique’s development process. It should first be 
recalled that the Government Five-Year Plan was discussed in Parliament involving all parties 
represented, and that INAS was created as a direct implementation of the Government Plan.”  
Therefore, in light of corruption and inefficiency charges against the GAPVU, this is evidence that 
the Government desired to continue roll-out and even increase cash transfer programmes for 
Mozambique. This portrays a positive Government view of cash transfer programmes, and 
furthermore motivation to reorganize the programme to increase efficiency and impact. 
The mission of the programme to ‘minimize the difficulties of the poor’ and not 
necessarily promote widespread poverty eradication remained the same under INAS. The ‘new’ 
programme’ had two major transformations being in the inclusion of the rural poor as targeted 
beneficiaries and the focus specifically on the poor who were unable to work (Low et al. 1999, p. 
7). The inclusion of rural areas arose because the former reconstruction plan schemes that 
provided food subsidies for free or through cash-for-work programmes in rural areas were 
discontinued by 1997. Yet, there were still thousands of people in rural areas who had benefited 
from this social safety net programme and still needed assistance. INAS initially expanded the 
programme to six rural centres, with administration based on local political pressure (Low et al . 
1999). It could also be that this programme expanded to rural areas as a way for Frelimo to 
garner support in Renamo-dominated rural areas. 
At this time, the monitoring of the programme tightened in response to the corruption-
due-to-weak-administration claims of previous evaluations. By December 1997 there were only 
30,000 social cash transfer beneficiaries, less than a third of GAPVU’s numbers at its height in 
1996. This reduced number of beneficiaries, despite a large increase in geographical coverage, 
however, was either a result of the removal of ‘ghost beneficiaries’ or moreover a result of the 
newly formed targeting and therefore removal of those who had the physical ability to do work 
(Low et al. 1999; Massingarela and Nhate 2006). This period of corruption charges, closure of 
GAPVU’s office and decline in beneficiaries has signified to some scholars weak political  support 
for the cash transfer. What does the immediate creation of INAS within the Government’s Plan 
and expansion of the cash transfer to rural areas, however, signify (Low et al. 1999; Waterhouse 
and Lauriciano 2009)?  
3.ii.c. The PSA Under INAS 
The PSA food subsidy programme, also known today as the Basic Social Subsidy 
Programme (PSSB) continued under the INAS post-1997, and today it is the most widespread 
cash transfer in Mozambique. The PSSB has continued to receive increasing amounts of funding 
directly from the State budget over time (G20 France 2011; UNICEF 2014). With over 140,000 
beneficiary households in 2008, it has the second highest number for cash transfer beneficiar ies 
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after Ethiopia (and excluding South Africa) as per a study performed in 2013 (Garcia and Moore 
2012, p. 59). While the number of beneficiaries of the PSA is high compared to other  countries, 
the coverage is still weak in relation to the potentially qualifying beneficiaries in Mozambique, a 
place with poverty levels nearing 50% of the total population (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). 
While enjoying high levels of Government prioritization in the last 18 years, expansion into rural  
areas post-GAPVU has succeeded in reaching all districts of Mozambique, but has faced difficulty 
with rising administrative costs and weak individual outreach (Soares, Hirata and Ribas 2010). 
While the value of each cash transfer continues to change, since 2008 the cash transfer has 
contributed on average 21.8% of a beneficiary household’s consumption yet only 10% of the 
minimum wage (Garcia and Moore 2012; Handa et al. 2012; Soares, Hirata and Ribas 2010). This 
can be viewed as a high amount of monthly expenditure, yet hardly enough to cover household 
needs.  
3.ii.d. Expansion of various social cash transfers  
Reviews of GAPVU and the creation of INAS opened up the second wave of cash transfers 
for Mozambique, with the cash transfer programme’s targeting definition of absolute poverty 
narrowed in on those unable to work. This widely impacted the beneficiary numbers as well as 
the strains on administrative capacity to deliver to new beneficiaries. Coincidently, another 
important change that came with these reviews and need for improved administration was the 
recommendation for INAS to work in partnership with non-governmental organizations to 
achieve its outreach goals (Low et al. 1999, p. 36). Around the mid-2000s, INAS gradually created 
a Social Fund or scheme that donors could contribute to for a number of social assistance 
programmes. This Social Fund still exists within INAS, and the two most consistent donors to this 
Social Fund have been the Embassy of Netherlands and the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015; Greany 2015; UN Mozambique 
2015).  
 Because of the removal of able-workers as beneficiaries for the cash transfer 
programmes, in 1999 INAS created two new income-generation schemes for small business 
owners and food-for-work within its growing social assistance platform (Massingharela and 
Nhate 2006, p. 3; 16). These programmes were all created to complement the PSA, and provide 
expanded social services. From the mid-1990s to today, there have also been several types of 
cash transfers in Mozambique, from short-term ad-hoc programmes such as the UNDP funded, 
government implemented Soldier Demobilization Grant of the early 1990s and the USAID funded 
Flood Victim Grant of 2000, to the education conditional cash transfer (MISA) that was imported 
from Brazil but did not last longer than a year (Hanlon 2004; Massingarela and Nhate 2006; 
Standing 2008). Those programmes were short-term, with a consistent facet of short-term 
grants being partially-to-fully funded and implemented by donors.  
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3.iii. Promotion and Growth of Social Protection in Mozambique 
Since the closure of GAVPU and the creation of INAS in the late 1990s, Mozambique’s 
urban poverty-focused cash transfer programme has expanded through internal political and 
external actor support. Today, INAS is part of the social protection and welfare sector that 
includes other government and non-governmental supported initiatives towards social action. 
Information gathered from ten interviews with government and NGO actors working directly 
with cash transfer programmes highlighted several explanations for the growth of cash transfer 
programmes in Mozambique after GAPVU. These rationales touch on the positive views by 
Government of cash transfer programmes after the success of GAPVU, the pressures for growth 
from development and international finance institutions, and views on the increase of cash 
transfers after the 2008 and 2010 urban food riots in Maputo. 
3.iii.a. Focus within Mozambique’s new, externally inclusive poverty agenda 
As portrayed in Chapter Two, poverty alleviation had always been on Frelimo’s agenda 
due to its position that poverty reduction was a means to promote equality. Thus, poverty 
reduction and the reinvigoration of social services remained on the Frelimo agenda throughout 
the civil war and reconstruction, through GAPVU and other cash-for-work programmes. With the 
adoption of SAPs and under President Joachim Chissano, the Government of Mozambique’s 
political orientation became more welcoming to free-market orientation and capitalism. 
Neoliberal positioning included increased donor responsibilities as well as NGO involvement in 
social services as a proxy for civil society (Ferguson 2006; Reis 2012). Therefore, the state’s role 
in development and social services evolved in the last twenty years to become what it is today, 
whereby Mozambique is seen as ‘donor dependent’. This is because liberalisation of the 
development sector has meant that external actors have played an increasing role in poverty 
reduction and development work, instead of this responsibility remaining in the hands of the 
state (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Hanlon and Smart 2008; Pitcher 2002). The inclusion of 
external actors in assisting the most vulnerable populations is a contrast from the early 1990s, 
when neoliberalism restricted the Government’s influence to focusing on the most vulnerable, 
and no longer influence over all populations; now the sphere of the poor had to be shared. 
During the same period, from the end of the 1990s and onward, poverty entered center stage on 
international agendas, first with social funds, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and then 
poverty strategy papers (Mkandawire 2010). These agendas were welcomed into Mozambique 
too given the Government’s new donor-friendly political orientation.  
Foreign donors 
As mentioned, one of the 1997 evaluations of GAPVU recommended to the Ministry of 
Finance that the programme needed to begin to receive support from NGOs (Massingharela and 
Nhate 2006). Foreign donors had been present in Mozambique’s political and economic spheres 
starting after independence from a couple Nordic countries and then when international 
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financial institutions gained authority there during the SAP time period (De Renzio and Hanlon 
2007). It is worthwhile to consider that SAPs created such ‘politically risky’ economic growth 
requirements for African leaders to carry out, that “long-term flows of concessional aid” became 
a necessity. This was clearly the case for Mozambique, after having not received much aid post-
independence to a period after SAPs where a majority of GDP came from aid (Herbst 19990, p. 
957). In 2004, it was noted that foreign aid made up 23% of Mozambique’s national income, 
making it the 8th most aid dependent country in the world (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007, p. 3). 
The period of 1995-2005 has been titled the ‘period of accommodation’ of donors according to 
De Renzio and Hanlon (2007). This is a time period where the World Bank and the IMF loosened 
their hold on Mozambique as structural adjustment wore down. This paved way for Western 
European donors to move in. It is described that the donor community and the State reached a 
“modus vivendi in which the government’s policy agenda  was mostly dominated by the IFIs and 
donors, without a clear national development vision” (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007, p. 6). Until 
2006, however, these organizations only played technical assistance roles in Mozambique’s cash 
transfer programmes, and as noted the finances and budgeting of social protection programmes 
came directly from and were managed by the Government.  
PRSPs: PARPA I and PARPA II 
 The ‘loosened hold’ of the World Bank and IMF is debatable, as this was also the time 
when these institutions implemented their poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). These 
papers or policies were a requirement for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to receive 
debt relief. In Mozambique, they are known as the Government’s Action Plan for the Reduction 
of Absolute Poverty- Plano de Acçao para a Reduçao do Pobreza Absoluta (PARPA) (De Renzio 
and Hanlon 2007; Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009). Tying the new development orientation 
together with the impact of the PSRPs, De Renzio and Hanlon (2007, p. 4) point out that “Despite 
the emphasis that the government ha[d] put on increasing domestic revenues in its poverty 
reduction strategy (known as PARPA), between 1997 and 2004 revenues fluctuated around 12% 
of the GDP, without any substantial increases.” The first poverty reduction paper of Mozambique 
ran from 2001-2005, known as PARPA I. As a carry-over from structural adjustment, PARPA I 
promoted economic growth through market liberalization, fiscal restraint and strengthening the 
environment for private sector growth (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009, p. 6). In addition, 
PARPA I was claimed to be written with strong donor support yet none from civil society, and 
“was submitted to donors for comment but never submitted to Parliament, and was mostly seen 
as a document directed at donors for complying with the requirements of HIPCs” (De Renzio and 
Hanlon 2007, p. 10)  
The results of PARPA I were measured through the second National Poverty Assessment 
from 2002-03, and showed that absolute poverty levels had dropped from 69% to 54% of the 
population. Calculations of these figures by the Ministry of Finance are debatable to some 
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scholars and income inequality actually increased during this period (Hanlon and Smart 2008; 
Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009, p. 6). Of note, PARPA I did not explicitly promote cash transfer  
programmes or social safety nets. During the time of PARPA I in the early 2000s, Devereux (2002, 
p. 658) explained that: 
“According to the World Bank itself (1994: 163): ‘It is likely that narrowly targeted interventions 
to reach specific groups of the poor will play only a small role in the poverty reduction 
strategies of most African countries.’ This view is evident in the limited or non -existent role 
ascribed to safety nets or social protection in most national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs).”  
Massingarela and Nhate (2006, p. 15) also support this when stating that social 
protection was not included in the priority areas of PARPA I, however there is a discrepancy on 
whether the food subsidy program was included in the strategy elsewhere.   By 2006, however, 
cash transfer programmes and social safety nets took up greater importance in poverty 
reduction strategies around the world. This is seen in Mozambique in the inclusion of the PSA 
and social protection through ‘social action’ as a priority area  in PARPA II, which ran from 2006-
2009 (Massingarela and Nhate 2006). The rationale for the inclusion of social safety nets stems 
from the realization of the importance of protecting those without work capabilities, which had 
already been a running theme in the 1997 adjusted PSA. Thus, the PSA was already fulfilling 
objectives of these poverty agendas, but only became a ‘priority area’ of PARPA II, which 
formerly comprised of health, education and sanitation. UNICEF (2007, p. 2) notes that the 
Performance Assessment Framework of PARPA II was “reviewed annually by government and 
partners-instrumental in creating a space for dialogue with the Minister of Planning and 
Development, Minister of Finance and bilateral partners on the expansion of unconditional cash 
transfer programmes.” PARPA II covered the period of approval of Mozambique’s Social 
Protection Law and of other joint legislative support to the social protection sector (UN 
Mozambique 2015). Therefore, it makes sense to see commitment to expand social protection at 
this time, through PARPA II’s allocation of additional resources to this sector and through 
international lobbying for social protection (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009, p. 9).  
From 2008-2014 (a period covered by PARPA II’s 2006-2009 range), the social welfare 
sector (INAS and MMAS) grew from .84% of the total government budget, to 1.64% by 2014 
(UNICEF 2014, p. 4). By 2014 the priority areas grew to take up 64% of the government 
expenditure, with social welfare comprising 3.1% of that figure (UNICEF 2014, p. 4). The increase 
in budget allocations to social action are not only justified by the growth in the national 
expenditure, but also the transition in the role of government from PARPA I to PARPA II. 
Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009, p. 7) note that even though PARPA II implies poverty 
reduction through economic growth and continued liberal market economics, it “includes 
important emphasis on the state’s role in basic social service provision.” This is different from 
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the so-called policy-level retracted-state view of structural adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s, 
and resonates more closely to the Frelimo government’s view of what the state’s role should be 
regardless of attempts to confine its central role in social services (World Bank 1995). 
3.iii.b. Social protection policy and the Social Welfare Sector 
Externally, bodies such as the UN and the ILO state that while 73% of the world does not 
have access to comprehensive social protection, it is a key strategy in reaching the Sustainable 
Development Goals focused on eradication of poverty (ILO 2015; Ellis, Devereux and White 
2009). ‘Social Protection Floors’ are “Nationally defined sets of at least four basic social security 
guarantees that ensure basic income security for all and access to universal essential health 
care” (ILO 2015). Social cash transfers are included in social protection floor activities as they 
provide cushions against socio-economic shocks and foster inclusive growth. The growth of the 
PSA paved the way for the Mozambique’s dynamic social protection floor, especially as a low-
income country. 
While it is evident that Mozambique had already been carrying out social protection 
programmes as part of the wider push for social services post-independence, there lacked 
official social protection policy even within the early poverty reduction agendas (Waterhouse 
and Lauriciano 2009, p. 9). With social protection and cash transfer programmes running 
consistently for almost 15 years, why was there no guiding policy document or overall social 
protection framework until 2007? While GAPVU and INAS were created under official 
government resolutions, they did not fit into wider Government strategies or policies on social 
protection until much later. Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009, p. 9) attribute this to the “history 
of colonial rule and the Government’s failed attempt after national Independence to provide 
free basic services to all Mozambicans.” This view implies that the Government’s provision of 
free education and healthcare, which faced challenges during the civil war and under SAPs, was a 
failure for administrative reasons and not results of war destruction and external privatization 
policy. It also implies that a lack of social protection policy was due to the Government’s ego 
bruise from previously failed programmes. A lack of policy, however, does not mean that the 
Government did not support social protection and cash transfer programmes and should not 
overshadow the official resolutions passed by the Council of Ministers to form GAPVU and INAS. 
With evidence from GAPVU, MISA, the Soldier Demobilization Grant, and the creation of INAS, i t 
is hard to argue that the Government had no interest in social protection.  
When the Social Protection Law was approved by Government in 2007 (Resolution 
4/2007), it defined social protection as “a right for all citizens and established the legal basis for  
the social protection system” (UN Mozambique 2015, p. 7). This law structured the three-pillar 
social security system: Basic Social Protection (under the direction of the Ministry of Women and 
Social Action); Social Insurance (Ministry of Labour); and complementary social protection from 
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private and voluntary sectors (Waterhouse and Lauriciano 2009, p. 9). The overall consolidation 
of the social protection system took two periods: Stage one, 2005-2010: establishment of a legal  
and strategic framework for social protection, and Stage two, 2011-Present: implementation of 
the National Strategy for Basic Social Security in order to expand coverage to beneficiaries 
(Chivambo 2015; UN Mozambique 2015). By 2014, all four cash transfer programmes of INAS still 
only included 15% of the poor population (UNICEF 2014, p. 8). Under the new Social Protection 
Law, the PSA, the successor to GAPVU, officially changed its name to the PSSB. Today, the four 
basic social protection programmes under INAS are:  
1. Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) 
2. Direct Social Support Programme (PASD) 
3. Productive Social Welfare Programme (PASP) 
4. Social Welfare Social Services (SASS) 
External actor roles in social protection policy 
What was the delay in creating a national social protection policy? One can comment that 
for the case of Mozambique there was a ‘delay’, because existing social protection work had 
already been implemented for almost two decades. Therefore, there lacked a rush to create 
policy around an existing system already being carried out. The insertion of a social protection 
policy in Mozambique in 2007 made sense, however, in terms of the chronology of international  
social protection development. This was the time when the continent had started to focus on 
the promotion of basic social protection in Africa. The African Union hosted a conference on 
‘Examining the Case for Basic Social Protection in Africa’ in March of 2006, and it was ther e that 
Mozambique, along with 12 other African countries signed the Livingstone Call to Action. This 
called upon national governments to “put together national social transfer plans within 2-3 years 
that are integrated within National Development Plans and within National Budgets, and that 
development partners can supplement” (AU 2006). These clauses most likely motivated the 
Government of Mozambique to officiate a social protection law.  
Antunes (2015), Director of Gender and Social Protection at the Embassy of Netherlands 
in Mozambique, is one of few sources to describe that the growth in the social protection sector 
and policy initially came to be via ILO lobbying even as early back as discussions in 1996-97. In 
1998, the ‘first’ policy was approved, and the second ‘main’ policy, or consolidation of policy, 
was enacted in 2007 and in 2009 (Antunes 2015). Evidence of this ‘first’ policy from 1998 has not 
been sourced, unless the ‘first’ policy is synonymous to the resolution creating INAS.  From the 
donor perspective, the consolidation of policy in the late 2000s was catalyzed by interested 
donors approaching government in 2006, and in reaction to lack of social action measurement 
indicators in PARPA, as will be addressed below (De Rooij 2015).  It was also the foundation for 
designing the National Strategy for Basic Social Security (ENSSB) from 2009-2010 (UN 
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Mozambique 2015). Karin de Rooij (2015), who at the time of interview was the Social Protection 
Specialist at UNICEF Mozambique and previously was the Social Protection Specialist at the 
Embassy of the Netherlands (replaced by Eleasara Antunes), provided further details on DFID 
and the Embassy of the Netherlands being the first two donors to start looking at the PSA in 
2005. In 2006 the two organizations approached the Ministry of Women and Social Action 
(MMAS) to get involved with the PSA financially. Therefore, “this opened a ‘jar’ and the Embassy 
of Netherlands and [then] UNICEF jumped onto it [not just for financial support’ but to get a 
measurement indicator for government on social action and social protection, and this was a 
huge step” (De Rooij 2015).  
In 2009, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed between Government and 
select organizations.  DFID and the Embassy of Netherlands became ‘official’ donors, although 
they had already been donating since 2006. This MOU allowed UNICEF to contribute technical 
assistance, and the ILO provided social protection floor support in addition to macro-level policy 
work and fiscal space advisory. These are the four stakeholders who have consistently played a 
role in shaping the growth of social protection in Mozambique in the last ten years (Antunes 
2015; De Rooij 2015). Today, as emphasized in Antunes’ and Greany’s (2015) interviews, the 
social protection portfolio includes funding INAS and the PSSB through a common scheme or 
common fund, with the Embassy of the Netherlands and DFID being the only two direct donors 
to the cash transfers carried as the PSSB. In an interview with Ivete Alane (2015), who is 
currently the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Sport and Youth, and was formerly the 
Permanent Secretary for MMAS, she noted that symbolically the PSA became the four 
programmes (noted above) of the ENSSB, and that is a positive sign that Government 
understands the impact of social cash transfers. 
Antunes (2015) remarked that in 2009, when donors first signed the MOU to officially 
enable external donations to social protection, the PSSB was 30-40% donor funded. Today, it is 
only 9-11% donor funded and there are efforts by Government to decrease this external funding 
even more (UNICEF 2014). For the whole social protection sector, direct donations to social 
action and welfare work is only 11% from external sources, and this is a trend that reflects the 
Government’s original position (as seen in GAPVU) as being the only direct funder of social 
action and notably cash transfers (Alane 2015; UNICEF 2014). Greany (2015) also took this 
further in explaining that initial donor funding to this sector was important during its growth 
phase, because the new Basic Social Security provision was “quite ambitious, so there was an 
expectation to receive donor funding.” She further stated that DFID has an interest in capacity 
building and funding systems, and not necessarily funding cash transfers directly, thus the 
decline in DFID funding over time while government funding increases works cohesively (Greany 
2015).  
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What is important to note is that the main change that came with the creation of the 
Social Protection Law was the ability for donors to contribute directly into social protection 
programmes, and for the programme to begin working with external actors on a financial and 
non-financial basis, as recommended in the PSRPs. It can be analysed that donors had strong 
influence over helping Mozambique craft its Law, and in interviews it was confirmed that the ILO, 
AU, and inquiries into donation prospects played a strong role in the creation of the Law 
(Antunes 2015). It could also be that the government welcomed in external funding through the 
policy in order to receive support to expand programmes and better capacitate the 
implementing organization, INAS. Donors to social protection are viewed to have a cooperative, 
and not a competitive, relationship with INAS, and this point can be supported even in light of 
the Government’s current push to decrease external donor funding. 
3.iii.c. Food riots response 
Chapter two and the literature review presented the common transition from food aid to 
social cash transfers as improved development programmes because of their greater ability to 
reach deserving populations. Chapter two did note that food aid through subsidies had been a 
staple safety net programme for millions of Mozambicans during the time of independence and 
during the civil war. Despite the coverage and because of their inefficiencies, however, there was 
little objection when these programmes stopped (O’Laughlin 1996). The relationship between 
food aid and social cash transfer growth after GAPVU, presented some differences in the late 
2000’s. The more recent link between social cash transfers and the urban food riots had to do 
with Government measures to address urban insecurity and perhaps using social protection to 
do so.  
The 2008 and 2010 food riots in a few of the larger cities in Mozambique can be 
described as violent protests by ordinary citizens, addressing the rising costs of living in those 
cities (De Brito et al. 2014). In 2012, there was another set of riots that were quickly appeased by 
police action, too. De Brito et al. (2014), of the Mozambican think-tank, the Institute of Social 
and Economic Studies, argue that the Mozambican food riots can fit into a wider worldwide 
movement. This movement includes uprisings addressing the volatility of food prices that also 
uncover the social and political exclusion of the world’s poorest populations. Particularly in 
Mozambique, the period of the late 2000s, similar to the late 1980s, was one of difficulty in 
accessing food in urban and rural areas because of weak domestic production and rise in food 
prices, and the same situation for fuel (De Brito et al. 2014; O’Laughin 1996). The result was a 
text-message circulated call for a ‘strike’ starting in Maputo on February 5th, 2008, which turned 
into a violent protest of looting, burning and stoning vehicles, and blocking roads for three days 
in Matola and Maputo.  
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Similar text-message initiated protests occurred on September 1 and 2 of 2010, and 
again on the 15th and 16th of November 2012. These protests always started in Maputo, where 
scholars have addressed there are higher levels of education and access to information, in 
addition to unemployment and the largest concentration of poverty and inequality as compared 
the rest of the country (De Brito 2014, p. 19-20). Rising inequality due to migration of vulnerable 
populations during the war and SAPs-induced inflation was the context when GAPVU was first 
implemented and a reason for starting the cash transfers in Maputo (Schubert 1992). The direct 
response of Government to the 2008 protests, however, became one of condemnation and 
repression of the right to protest through considering them illegal and unproductive towards 
‘the fight against poverty’ (De Brito et al. 2014, p. 28). In 2010, however, the Government 
message transformed into one of delivering on economic measures to control prices and 
incentives that would support citizens against the pressures of increased costs of living (which 
had to do with fuel) (De Brito 2014, p. 28). The 2010 response of the Government is more closely 
related to the late 1980s response by the Government to curb inflation pressures through 
GAPVU. 
From interviews, there are mixed positions regarding whether the food riots from 2008-
2012 had an influence over increased social protection budgets from the Mozambican State. 
While De Rooij (2015) and Antunes (2015) noted that from 2009 onwards, the period after the 
first food riot, the social action budget increased. To them, this was most likely due to non-
governmental organizations, such as their respective work places of UNICEF and the Embassy of 
Netherlands, using the platform of the food riots to demand increased social protection 
(Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015). It was enquired in interviews whether civil society directly 
demanded cash transfers and social protection to address the food insecurity as part of their 
protest messages. The answers were negative on the part of civil society however there was a 
push from academia and NGOs that was picked up by Government (De Rooij 2015). The specific 
message that came from civil society, through the Civil Society Platform for Social  Protection 
(Plataforma Sociedade Civil- Proteção Social) was to stop rising food and fuel prices in urban 
areas (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015). Antunes (2015) does clarify that she felt the that the food 
riots and the social unrest they created reinforced support for social protection, and this is why 
by 2011 a heightened budget increase is observable. To support her position, she pointed out 
that in 2012, after the second food riots, government created a ‘basic basket’ of subsidized 
goods (Antunes 2015). De Brito et al. (2014, p. 34) substantiate that in the Government response 
to the riots, via their 2010-2014 Strategic Urban Poverty Reduction Programme (PERPU), they 
noted the growth of social protection and creation of job opportunities as two prioritized areas. 
From the side of the Government, Alane (2015) was working at MMAS, the ministry 
overlooking social cash transfers at that time. She stated that the increase in budget to social 
protection was actually a result of years of policy building and lobbying, that led to increases at 
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coincidently the same time. It is important to recall that 2007 was the year that the Social 
Protection Law came to be, and that 2009 was when the National Basic Social Security Strategy 
was put in place (UN Mozambique 2015). Alane’s response challenging the link between food 
riots and social protection budget growth should also take into context the political climate and 
sentiments towards the food riots. It has been observed that the origination of protests in the 
late 2000’s in Maputo came by surprise to the Government, as Maputo also has a population 
with more sympathy for the ruling elite than other areas (De Brito et al. 2014). From another 
standpoint, the unsuspected food riots could be rationalized as the use of increased social 
protection by political elites to appeal to civil society, as seen in other places, or it could justify 
why Alane is hesitant to connect the two issues.  
While there are various stances on the connection between the food riots and the 
creation and expansion of social protection in Mozambique, what is significant to note is the l ink 
between urban insecurity in both cases and the responses met from Government with or 
without civil society demands. While there were no urban protests noted when GAPVU was 
created, as in the case of the food riots of the late 2000’s, GAPVU was started at a time of civil 
war and mass migration. That context left the Government feeling insecure to the possibility of 
urban revolts in an already overpopulated urban context because of rural war migrants. As 
pointed out by Lavers and Hickey (2015), social cash transfers can become a political tool to 
appease threats of uprising or opposition. Without particularly being a ‘direct’ response to the 
food riot demands of the 2000s, the Government was more than likely aware that increased 
social protection and cash transfers could be a way to address urban insecurity and urban 
uprisings due to vulnerability. Food prices did rise in the late 1980s due to SAPs induced 
inflation, and that was one of the reasons why GAPVU started. As has been noted, GAPVU’s 
continuation after the 1980s was a sign that the Government found the cash transfer to be an 
effective mechanism to address increasing levels of urban insecurity and rising poverty related to 
inflation and economic hardships. Therefore, their prioritization of social protection in the 2000s 
to respond to similar economic contexts in addition to more active citizen demands and 
uprisings, is justifiable because of past action related to GAPVU.  During the late 2000s, the 
Government received additional support and motivation from donor organisations to increase 
social protection coverage for similar rationales, and ones that had been clear to them 
throughout the 1990s. The lack of civil society demand directly for cash transfers in these cases 
almost portray how cash transfers have come to a be a ‘preferred’ mode of intervention by the 
Government of Mozambique, well before this tool has become mainstream by other 
governments worldwide. 
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3.iii.d. Timeline of Major Dates of Social Protection in Mozambique 
The chart below presents key dates and activities in the consolidation of the Social 
Protection System in Mozambique from 2005-2015, as emphasized by the ILO, UNICEF and 
World Food Programme (UN Mozambique 2015, p. 6-14): 
2005 Low coverage, fragmentation, limited technical capacity and lack of policy 
instruments 
2006 The Livingstone Conference, increased donor interest and the incorporation of Social  
Action in the Government Poverty Assessment Framework 
2007 Approval of the Law on Social Protection and consolidation to one UN support 
system for this sector 
2008 Signing onto the Social Policy Framework for Africa and receiving institutional 
support to INAS 
2009 Consolidation of the Legislative Policy Framework for the social protection system 
2010 Approval of the National Strategy for Basic Social Security (2010-2014); period of 
fiscal space and capacity development 
2011 Creation of the new programmes within ENSSB’s implementation framework  
2012 Development of a new operational system for the social protection programmes 
2013 Increased budget allocations, expansion of the programmes and the creation of the 
technical secretariat for the CCSSSB 
2014 Evaluation of the ENSSB; the development of an information management system 
and a single registry 
2015 Revision of the National Strategy for Social Security; the rollout of the MIS an the re-
registration of current beneficiaries 
 
3.iv. Analysis 
The opportunity to interview several key stakeholders within the social protection sector 
of Mozambique today provided detail and clarification on the history of social protection growth 
since the late 1990s and more specifically from 2005 onwards. From these interviews, there 
were two other emergent themes that helped gauge views on how state autonomy despite 
neoliberal influence played out, as seen through the case of social cash transfers. These two 
themes are discussed below. 
3.iv.a. State views on social protection and state role in social protection growth 
Every interview that occurred in addition to several publications make note that GAPVU 
and the PSA/PSSB were social cash transfer programmes that were initiated and predominantly 
funded by the Government of Mozambique. While a unique aspect for a low-income 
government’s own programme, consideration should be given to the fact that the percentage of 
the national expenditure that goes to social action work is still below ILO and IMF targets of .8% 
of GDP on an international level. Is the Government actually a supporter of these programmes as 
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they were when they started GAPVU, or has the provision of social cash transfers become a 
pressure from the external donor community? Have the Government had one consistent 
position? These conflicting realities motivate one to further question how ‘state autonomy’ is 
measured. Is the extent of state autonomy simply measured by the state’s ability to 
autonomously decide and act on social protection, free from external influence such as the 
possibility of neoliberalism dissuading the Government towards owning a role over these 
programmes? Or is autonomy merely measured by a percentage of budget support that the 
Government is able to give to these programmes? The former places more emphasis on a 
measurement of state autonomy and action, within the confines of not only neoliberalism, but 
its own monetary constraints as a low-income country. The question is not whether or not the 
state exercised autonomy, but what type of autonomy and action took place while considering 
the constraints of neoliberalism.  
In engaging the question of ‘state views’ of cash transfers during interviews with 
development specialists, several responses noted the inconsistent views of the Minister of 
Finance on cash transfer programmes. As noted, support from the previous Ministers of Finance 
when GAPVU was initiated and belonged under their portfolio were ‘key success factors’ for this 
early cash transfer programme, one that did not have many other Sub-Saharan Africa examples 
to learn from (Schubert 2015). While the PSA does not sit within the Ministry of Finance 
anymore, the Ministry of Finance is still the Department in charge of making budget decisions for  
all government bodies. As clarified by Alane (2015) and Garcia and Moore (2012, p. 283), all 
Government departments receive funding directly from the Ministry of Finance as a conduit for 
national budget funds. Thus, the Ministry of Finance still plays a role in determining the financial  
allocation of Government resources to INAS and the MMAS, which is important at a time when 
Government is significantly scaling back the amount of external funding to social action work 
(Antunes 2015; UNICEF 2014). In the future, growth in Government funding directly to social 
cash transfers can be justified because of the positive examples of Government funding 
impacting GAPVU’s success.  
Antunes (2015) commented that from her experience, some “Ministers of Finance can be 
defensive [towards social protection] because of the ‘handouts’ view” of social welfare and social 
cash transfer programmes. She further stated that “advocates try to portray social protection as 
an ‘investment’, and that advocates strategically involve the Minister of Finance” to work 
towards the benefit of the sector. Greany (2015) also noted that during her time in 
Mozambique, she has observed that the “lazy poor” mentality still exists in some conversations 
with Government. That is why there is an observable growth in public works programmes, most 
noticeably through the Government approaching the World Bank for public works support 
(Fernandes 2015; Greany 2015). Overall, De Rooij (2015) and a UNICEF (2014) publication 
emphasize that “social protection has been received positively, as seen in the budget growth 
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sometimes at 40-50% over the course of a year; although it is ‘easy’ when the percentage of 
budget is still very small, the margin of growth can be great.” Therefore, despite skepticism 
claims from Government, the programmes are still funded, rolled-out, and include measures to 
increase direct Government support. Lastly, while no longer the administrative body for social 
cash transfers, the Ministry of Finance is still viewed as playing a crucial role even from a 
lobbying perspective as they make decisions on funding amounts.  
De Rooij (2015), whose institutional knowledge was more extensive than most 
interviewees due to her seven years of work in the sector in Mozambique, explained that from 
her view,  
“Two big events that really strengthened the government relationship and agenda for social 
protection were: 1. the provision of external support (through the ILO) in the legal framework 
(policy and strategy) building procedure in 2009/2010. This is where the multi-sectoral approach 
was built, and it pulled other actors together with an aligned development agenda through 
PARPA. Here, they invested in training and exchange visits for ministers (including the Minister of 
Finance) to other countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia to visit other ministers and programmes. 
This facilitated getting a common vision for social protection. 2. Arab Spring: This was a signal to 
government on inequality, in conjunction with Mozambique’s food riots. Actors such as UNICEF 
and academia appealed to government that social protection could be a means to appease civil 
society.”  
The Arab Spring view is a unique take on a rationale for the growth of social protection, 
however, it does correlate to the food riots rationale of social protection increase as a response 
to uprisings related to rising inequality and vulnerability. De Rooij (2015) stated that she, through 
UNICEF and formerly the Embassy of Netherlands, felt lucky to be working with the Minister of 
Women and Social Action, the new implementing ministry for cash transfers that took over from 
the Ministry of Finance. The Institute that they work with, INAS, includes a few champions who 
have strongly supported social protection, instead seeing it as an ‘investment’ and not an 
‘unproductive handout’ as other Ministry of Finance skeptics may have seen it in the present and 
past (Antunes 2015). De Rooij (2015) further elaborated that the current Minister of Finance has 
had a “strong vision of social protection, instead of ‘unproductive handouts’ which caused 
difficulty before.” Several interviews did clarify that the perception of social cash transfers tend 
to change when a different Minister of Finance comes in and government seats (Greany 2015). 
For external stakeholders, they have to work to revise their visions and procedures with every 
political change (De Rooij 2015). This comment portrays that Government is the main actor 
responsible for social protection, and that donors must work around and to fit into their 
agendas, despite the international agendas that their organizations hold (Chivambo 2015). This 
also portrays that Government is the leading authority around cash transfers, and their role has 
remained regardless of the ‘roll-back’ and weak state emphasis that neoliberalism has tried to 
portray by including external actors and NGOs in social services and social protection. Therefore, 
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Ministry of Women and Social Action support in addition to Ministry of Finance support, as was 
in the days of GAPVU, are still critical success factors for cash transfers.  
In Alane’s (2015) view as a civil servant, she strongly noted that Government has a key 
interest in supporting social protection, however on the list of priority items for the Government 
to provide such as healthcare, education, infrastructure, agriculture, rural development, 
governance and security, social protection unfortunately falls after these priorities and this 
explains the weak budget support when compared to international targets (UNICEF 2014). 
Therefore, one is lead to question whether the international measures for .8% of GDP are 
realizable for a low-income and economically unstable country such as Mozambique. What is 
more a success measure for the State’s role in cash transfers: quantity in terms of programme 
funding amounts of quality in terms of consistently running and growing programmes? The latter 
would deem the Mozambican state as a successful example of a Government-run and funded 
cash transfer, uncommon for low-income, fragile states.  
That being said, to Alane (2015), the mere fact that Government continues to provide for 
these programmes and increase the Government expenditure annually (because of increased tax 
collection by Government), is a strong sign of commitment to this work on the side of 
Government. She lastly stated that from her experience in Government, if the Government had 
more money, they would certainly fund more, thus why increased tax collection is important 
(Alane 2015). She commented that, “Society claims that Government thinks that social 
protection and cash transfers are unproductive; this is not necessarily a shared perspective 
across all of Government and the willingness to grow social protection from Government is 
evidence of this” (Alane 2015). 
Alane (2015) noted that she felt that Government had good control over social protection, 
given the relationships it needs to maintain with external stakeholders too. A sentiment shared 
by Alane (2015) and the former Minister of Finance and Planning, Dr. Salomao (2015) was that 
the Government knows what it wants: the well-being of the population. It knows its priorities 
and how to get there, and it is Government’s own strategy, which is not in conflict with outside 
organizations. A majority of the interview respondents, whether from Government or outside, 
clearly acknowledge that the Mozambican Government is responsible for social protection 
growth (Antunes 2015; Chivambo 2015; De Rooij 2015; Greany 2015; Fernandes 2015). The 
reasoning for this could be that sector partners understand the difficulty of implementing social 
protection without Government buy in, or it could be a result of the long history that the 
Government has had with these home-grown programmes. Additional reasoning could include a 
sort of reverence that was felt from interviewees towards the Government for creating its own 
cash transfer programmes against political and economic odds, and without previous examples 
to learn from. Further evidence on this was the point that DFID grew into social protection in 
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Mozambique and added social protection to its local portfolio of work because the Government 
already had social protection programmes, not necessarily because it existed in neighboring 
country operations of DFID (Greany 2015).  These elements point to Weiss’ (2010) and Jinadu’s 
(2014) arguments that neoliberalism, and in this case the privatization of social protection and 
development work, cannot exist without a present and active, central role of the state in 
creating an enabling environment for neoliberal work to be carried out.  
Therefore, the Government’s previous work catalyzed further growth and support from 
other actors instead of actors coming in and creating their own programmes. While the case of 
external actors coming in and creating their own programmes has happened with Save the 
Children, the Embassy of Brazil and others, these programmes have not lasted (Ellis, Devereux 
and White 2009). Thus, as echoed in interviews, a critical success factor in social protection is 
cooperating with Government and also working within their programmes. But, there was stated 
concern regarding whether this cohesion will last as numerous new programmes outside of 
Government are popping up and causing fragmentation (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015). The 
significant growth in new programmes coming up, that did not happen during the first phase of 
Mozambican social cash transfers, is a result of the mainstreaming of social protection. All  these 
cases strongly support the consistent centrality of the State and its autonomy to exercise its role 
within social protection, dating back to the GAPVUs start during the neoliberal, anti-statist era. 
These respectful views towards the Government’s role in social protection also challenge the 
neoliberal ‘Mozambican success’ notion of weakening the state and privatizing social services 
and development.  
3.iv.b. Government ownership of programmes or dependency? 
Another view on the Government’s position on social cash transfers is the observation 
from development partners on the lack of ownership from the government. This view comes 
from Fernandes (2015), the Social Protection Consultant at the World Bank Mozambique, who 
also alluded to the State’s ever present autonomy in Mozambique especially in terms of 
receiving World Bank funding. Others noted the weak capacity of the Government to implement 
social protection, however, should capacity be a justification of autonomy given the public 
service-restrictive emphasis of neoliberal ideology (Alane 2015; Antunes 2015; Chivambo 2015; 
De Rooij 2015; Greany 2015)? As covered in the previous chapter, the World Bank’s relationship 
with Mozambique through structural adjustment and through support for the growth of GAPVU 
via the SDA programme is a complex history. From several interviews, the World Bank seems to 
continue to have a strong presence in Mozambique dating back from Bretton Woods 
membership in the mid-1980s. Their role within social protection, however, is different from the 
government and other donors, and perhaps from the World Bank’s role in other areas. 
Fernandes (2015) had only served 6 months in Mozambique at the time of our interview, but has 
a range of experience working on social protection since 2001 in Europe and in other parts of the 
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world, including Timor l’Este. Fernandes (2015) commented that from the World Bank’s 
perspective, while social protection came into Mozambique in 2007, the World Bank only began 
to be involved starting in 2013. At that time, the Government of Mozambique approached the 
World Bank to support ‘building systems’ through a social protection project from 2013-2018.  
What is important to note here is that funding support from the World Bank came at the 
request of the Mozambican Government, as that is the official process of receiving World Bank 
funding (Fernandes 2015). As pointed out in interviews with De Rooij (2015) and Salomao (2015), 
what is often overlooked is that World Bank funding is either from Government contributions to 
the Bank or loan provisions; therefore, the process is almost like requesting funding from one’s 
own account or requesting a loan that will be paid back by the recipient Government. In 
addition, the World Bank is the last main donor to the social protection sector in Mozambique, 
despite its early involvement and support to GAPVU through SDA. This point, regarding the gap 
in funding and involvement of the World Bank between SDA and 2013, could portray the hands-
off, almost ‘disinterested’, role of the World Bank throughout a large portion of social cash 
transfer evolution in Mozambique. What the Mozambique-World Bank relationship signifies, 
however, is that the Government has the ability to choose whether they want to work with the 
World Bank on their own programmes, such as social protection. This is a view different from the 
notion that since its civil war, Mozambique has been caught in a debt cycle that has created 
dependency on donors and Bretton Woods Institutions.  
In addition, the Government reached out to the WB with an interest in boosting up 
finances and technical assistance to expand cash transfers, a clear sign of Government support 
of social protection. The claims that the Government has a ‘lack of ownership’ over social 
protection can be regarded weakly because, as clarified through interviews, the Government is 
the starting point for requesting funding from the World Bank on these programmes. Therefore, 
a lack of ownership would have portrayed that Government did not have the impetus nor ability 
to request for funding. In addition, the claim that the Government has weak capacity to 
implement could stand correct, but it is important to note that the Government at least 
cooperates with donors and requests for funding to increase capacity for social protection.  As 
has been addressed, capacity to implement is a difficult indicator for state role in Mozambique 
because of the legacy of constrained social service human resources due to Portuguese 
colonization and neoliberal policy. The World Bank Social Protection programme does signal that 
the Government aspires to invest in expanded social service human capacity. 
Looking further at the World Bank support to social protection in Mozambique, ‘building 
systems’ is another term used for the ‘General Budget Support’ (GBS) that the World Bank, and 
other donors, provide as a form of development assistance. Massingarela and Nhate (2006, p. 
12) comment that this modality of external aid, from actors such as the African Development 
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Bank to the PSA via budget support, enables the “capacity building and state ownership of INAS 
activities.” Taking a critical view on the World Bank’s support and even the support of the other 
donors through GBS, De Renzio and Hanlon (2007, p. 16, 17) unpack that GBS is also known as:  
“the latest testing ground of government-donor-relations in Mozambique relate[d] to the 
arrangements that have been put in place for making the support that donors provide directly to 
the government budget. Its rationale and justification follows a simple argument: the failure of 
structural adjustment policies to ‘buy’ reform in many countries stems from the lack of political  
will to reform. Therefore, reform will only succeed where recipient governments ‘own’ their 
development strategies and the associated reform agenda. Ownership, in turn, comes as a result 
of the definition of a development strategy which allows for increasing control over the resources 
necessary to implement it… GBS, therefore, should be the preferred aid delivery modalities in all 
countries where donors feel comfortable with aligning with national systems and strategies. The 
subtle contradiction of the argument lies in the definition of the boundaries of ‘zone of comfort’ 
that donors are willing to accept.. This [intertwining with government standards] includes using 
the PARPA merely as an ‘operationalised’ version of the Government’s 5 -year plan, rather than as 
a policy document in its own right.” 
 The significance of the last sentence is that it points out the critical view by which the 
PARPA, and even going further back to the PRE and PRES, were indeed ‘government 
conceptualized and owned’ strategies. Whereby it is known that the PRE and PRES were 
synonymous to Mozambique’s structural adjustment implementation strategies, the PARPAs are 
less-explicitly stated so (Hanlon 1996). De Renzio and Hanlon (2007, p. 9) argue that since 
adoption of a neoliberal, free-market approach, the Government has failed in its attempts at a 
“nationally-owned development strategy based on a strong vision of future needs and policy 
priorities which are not dictated by external forces.” Furthermore, scholars note that PARPA II, 
which had been the key policy document through which donor support was agreed upon in a 
similar fashion to the PRES and IMF/WB support in the 1980s, used language of an “enabling 
state in in which the private sector is the main engine for growth and poverty reduction.” (De 
Renzio and Hanlon 2007, p. 10). These views are similar to that of Mkandawire (2001), when 
portraying how the World Bank started to include the ‘role of the state’ after 1989, after 
criticisms of its lack of emphasis, and this was done through its tool of ‘Good Governance’. Good 
governance has widely been attacked as a World Bank tool to give states a role, but having the 
World Bank directly define and measure what states should and should not be within that role 
(Mkandawire 2001). 
De Renzio and Hanlon (2007, p. 10) ascribe that in PARPA I Government was more 
focused on the provision of health and education, and this is interesting to see because those 
were areas underpinning debt cancellation in the late 1990s. Debt-cancellation through 
structural adjustment attempted to take these social services out of the hands of the 
Government’s former nationalization efforts, towards privatization of these services. De Renzio 
and Hanlon (2007, p. 19-20) explain that throughout the adjustment period, the IMF put heavy 
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caps on government spending, specifically in cutting the wages of teachers and health workers 
to not exceed 7% of the GDP as outlined in the Government Wage Bill within an IMF agreement. 
They described that this made donors anxious to increase GBS because cutting capacity in health 
and education would make it harder for Mozambique to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals. Cutting these services from Government support could be seen as a mechanism to 
maintain dependence on the BWIs and the conditions they had put on Mozambique starting in 
the mid-1980s. 
 
While these viewpoints on the current relationship between Government, the World 
Bank and over time a number of other donors are important in defining that the World Bank 
responds to the requests of Government, one must consider two points. First, on what level is 
the Government of Mozambique dependent on the World Bank to provide support? This is a 
view supported by Fernandes (2015) during her time in Mozambique. She argues that 
Government is already in a habit of requesting support from the World Bank due to the long 
relationship of World Bank support since the days of Structural Adjustment (Fernandes 2015). 
Second, is this demand by Government for donor support due to lack of resources (another 
structural adjustment privatization-gone-dependency issue) or is it because of what other 
interviewees called, a desire to include donors to signal a ‘vote of confidence’ from external 
stakeholders? 
Lastly, in terms of ‘government ownership’ of externally funded and, to an unknown 
extent, externally ‘written’ economic and social development strategies such as the PARPAs, PRE 
and PRES: to what extent do these ‘cooperative’ strategies signify a level of ‘autonomy’ of the 
Government in relation to donors and external actors? Or are these neoliberal ways of masking 
dependency-created-through-funding mechanisms of crafted notions of ‘ownership’ (De Renzio 
and Hanlon 2007)? Thus, does the World Bank’s ‘request’ procedure characterize ‘dependency’ 
or ‘autonomy’? Looking at the overall case of social cash transfers from the 1990s and until 
today, the World Bank has generally had a ‘hands off’ approach to social protection and cash 
transfer policy in Mozambique, despite worldwide engagements in these programmes starting 
before 2013. Looking more broadly, is this a case of another development programme 
superficially ‘in the hands’ of Government? Or is the case of cash transfers a truly Government-
owned programme with hints of scattered World Bank involvement on the sidelines, not strong 
enough to take away the Government’s central role? What level of ownership is the Government 
content with and willing to hold on to? For the case of social cash transfers, emphasis across all 
actors has been on the Government’s active, authoritative, and autonomous role, given the 
limitations of overstretched bureaucratic capacity and financial resources in addition to, and 
perhaps resulting from, neoliberal privatization efforts.  
Mkandawire (2010, p. 49) argues that: 
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“In all of the successful cases of fighting poverty under both democratic and authoritarian 
regimes, the state has assumed a ‘developmental’ role. One quite remarkable feature of the 
new social policy focused on MDGs or PRSPs is that the status and the requisite capacity of the 
state differ radically from the historical ‘success stories’…. Consequently, they are to be 
implemented by ‘regulatory states’ that are stripped of many of the instruments available to 
developmental states and whose main task is to ensure a ‘level playing field and the protection 
of property rights.” 
This, and perhaps a ‘spectrum’ of ownership mentality, needs to be considered when 
trying to address to what type of ownership states desire over programmes. For example, it is 
clear that Mozambique has ownership over their cash transfer programmes because they sit 
within Government and donors have to work within their programmes, with the exception of the 
World Bank Mozambique’s ‘Parallel Programme’ point of view (Antunes 2015). Is it therefore 
accepted that the Government allows donors to contribute and shape their home-grown 
programmes through policy, because they know at the end of the day these programmes, and 
other neoliberal activity, actually rely on them to be carried out, as emphasized by Evans (1995), 
Weiss (2010), Jinadu (2014) as new approaches to neoliberal analyses?  
3.v. Conclusion 
The question of the Mozambican Government’s autonomy under the conditions of 
neoliberalism and today under the condition of GBS is a ‘contested issue’ of national sovereignty 
challenged by external forces and internal political dynamics (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007, p. 22). 
What that means to De Renzio and Hanlon (2007, p. 22) is that for the past three decades, 
Mozambique has been conflicted with three issues. First, there is donor inflexibility on the 
policies they ‘influence’; second, there is a lack of unity from political parties against the donor 
community; and third, civil servant and bureaucratic capacity is overstretched in light of rising 
donor demands and aid management. In addition, these scholars question whether the 
Mozambican state is able to produce ‘locally defined development strategies’ or if the state has 
lost the ability towards expression of its national sovereignty because of the entrenchment of 
donors and external actors in the country over time.  
The cases presented in this chapter and the previous chapter attempt to challenge the 
notion that the Government faced reduced state autonomy and failed attempts at locally-
defined national development plans because of the external forces imposing conditions of 
structural adjustment, state roll-back, and of dependency-inducing aid. While the interviews 
presented in this chapter portray that the development community played a huge role in 
creating the policy environment for social cash transfers to grow, it must be recognized that the 
environment for these programmes to commence was through government initiative. In 
addition, Devereux (2013), Hanlon (2007), Herbst (1990), Jinadu (2010), Pitcher (2002), and 
Weiss (2010), all recognize that the neoliberal ‘state roll-back’ and move towards privatization 
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was only made possible through government acceptance of these conditions, and government 
creation of the policy and fiscal structures to enable these conditions. Therefore, how far could 
these ‘anti-statist’ efforts go against the Government, when ultimately relying on Government? 
This research argues that that in itself is an expression of withheld state autonomy actively 
engaged by state leadership, that should not be confused or labeled as a ‘weak state’. 
While De Renzio and Hanlon (2007) question the ability of Mozambique to portray its 
state sovereignty and authority over the development community, this chapter presents 
evidence to refute whether that is the right approach to take. In another sense, what does it 
mean when scholars label states as acting under ‘neoliberal influence’ or ‘socialist influence’, and 
has Mozambique had one political trajectory since independence? History shows us that the 
state, a majority of the time represented by the Frelimo Party, has switched from a rigid Marxist-
Leninist agenda after independence and throughout the civil war to the adoption of capitalism 
and a free-market approach towards the end the civil war until today (Hanlon and Smart 2008; 
Reis 2012). As this chapter has portrayed, however, the central question is not of what political 
orientation the State had and its influence on cash transfers. It is a question of the continuity of 
cash transfer programmes in Mozambique despite political ideology transformations leading to 
attempts to reduce the state, and changes to the social cash transfer trajectory externally. 
Mozambique, unlike many neighboring and developing countries, had faith in using cash 
transfers as a pro-poor solution way before they were mainstream development tools.  Although 
the state might have created GAPVU out of necessity to build solidarity in a time of war, as this 
research argues, it could have also been an attempt to cling on to subtle forms to exercise state 
autonomy and its expression of socialist ideology. What is important is the legacy of GAPVU and 
the state’s ability to hold onto its control over social services and social protection, and remain 
respected in the development community as having a level of ownership over this sector.  
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4. Chapter Four: Analysis 
4.i. Introduction 
The history of social cash transfers in Mozambique from the closure of GAPVU until today 
brings to light the importance of GAPVU starting at the time of and under the conditions it did, 
and of it being a completely government implemented and funded programme from its 
beginning. While most studies and reports on Mozambique’s cash transfer programmes of the 
last decade focus on their implementation and efficacy, most interviews solidly acknowledged 
the Government’s role being central to the survival and growth of these programmes. Greany 
(2015) summarized the significance of these programmes in their shift from being ‘pity hand 
outs’ because of the war to turning into impactful social protection programmes that are now 
linked to the idea of productive investments in poverty alleviation. This chapter will analyze how 
Mozambique’s social protection history benchmarks with others in Sub-Saharan Africa, and bring 
forth the ways that Mozambique’s case of cash transfers is exceptional in comparison to specific 
debates from the literature review that have not been covered in chapters two and three. It will 
also serve to argue that while Mozambique’s case of cash transfers can fit into typical debates on 
cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is story as a government-initiated long-term programme. 
Exceptionally, Mozambique’s case has seen continuity before and throughout the period of 
social protection going from unpopular to becoming mainstream in development agendas.  
4.ii. Trajectories of Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa 
To understand the growth of social protection in the last two decades, scholars have 
attempted to classify social protection programmes by the circumstances under which they are 
born out of in different countries. This is done by understanding the history of these 
programmes and the rationales for their inception and expansion under different social and 
political environments. Tracing the history of social cash transfer programmes in Mozambique of 
the last two decades uncovers how these programmes differ from the typical histories of social 
protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the ways that Mozambique’s often 
uncounted cash transfer history resonates within wider debates on Sub-Saharan Africa social 
protection.  
4.ii.a. Typical debates strengthened by the case of Mozambique 
This section presents ways that the Mozambican cash transfer history can fit into 
discussions on social protection growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, under the influence of cash 
transfers in Latin America and Europe. It also touches on the economic growth rationale for cash 
transfers and how it applies to Mozambique’s history. 
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Latin American and European social cash transfer influence in Mozambique 
The literature review touched on the debate that social protection programmes have 
weak links to European welfarist programmes, aside from influence of pension schemes in 
perhaps South Africa. It presents that a growth in interest in social protection most likely has 
roots in the successes seen in Latin American programmes (Midgley 2013). Lavinas (2013, p. 6) 
notes how there has been a recent trend of governments in industrialised countries to move 
towards conditional cash transfer programmes to replace the universal welfare provisions 
created in the early parts of the 20th century. Additionally, Latin American governments began to 
provide social cash transfers as part of a growing desire to provide social safety nets, in response 
to the inequality and instability caused by severe economic crises in the 1980s. These economic 
crises created conditions of high unemployment, high inflation, and decline in real wages i n Latin 
America, and were met by and exacerbated by structural adjustment programmes implemented 
by the IMF (Lavinas 2013). SAPs in Latin America, similar to in Sub-Saharan Africa, resulted in cuts 
on social spending, cuts on subsidies and a rise in the informal economy and poverty (Lavinas 
2013; Mkandawire 2010).  There was then a motivation to create a ‘cushion’ against the negative 
consequences of liberalization, and the existing ‘pay-as-you-go’ social protection systems could 
not cope with the shocks created by structural adjustment (Lavinas 2013). Out of the crises in 
Latin America came a privatization of pension funds, and an ‘enabling state’ role in the smooth 
operation of markets. Thereafter, was the birth of conditional cash transfers in Latin Ameri ca in 
the 1990s (Lavinas 2013). 
This history of Latin American social cash transfers is important because it resonates with 
the history of Mozambique’s cash transfers, more so than other histories of programmes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Lavinas (2013) summarises that conditional cash transfers and government-
backed social protection were the response of an enabled-state working against the detriment of 
SAPs. The Latin American conditions of weak economic capabilities and growing poverty were 
the same conditions (in addition to civil war) that motivated the Mozambican State to create 
GAPVU around the same time. There is also direct evidence of Latin American links, from Brazil ’s 
implementation a social cash transfer programme in Mozambique in 2003: the education cash 
transfer: MISA (Massingharela and Nhate 2006). This cash transfer was adopted from Brazil’s 
Bolsa Escola and was implemented by the Embassy of Brazil in Mozambique. As a conditional 
cash transfer which was externally implemented and funded outside of the Ministry of Finance, 
although requested and endorsed by the Mozambican Government, it faced challenges and only 
lasted year (Massingharela and Nhate 2006).  
While an interesting exception of a Brazilian-imported conditional cash transfer coming 
over a decade after GAPVU, MISA and the information from Lavinas (2013) present only weak 
and indirect examples of influence from Latin American countries. In addition, because of the 
timing, it is doubtful that the Mozambican Government was influenced by Latin America when 
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first creating GAPVU. The growth of the social protection sector, however, could have many links 
to Latin American cash transfers. The worldwide acclaim they have received most likely 
influenced the mainstreaming of social protection and cash transfer programmes within 
development agendas. What is notable about the histories of Latin American cash transfers and 
Mozambican ones is that they present similar conditions under which governments are 
motivated to use cash transfers as interventions. The conditions of SAPs, inflation, economic 
instability in addition to rising inequality clearly create such difficulties that innovation in poverty 
programmes is needed to reach out to and build solidarity with large numbers of chronically 
poor people, from governments with weak financial and bureaucratic capabilities. As mentioned 
in the literature review, cash transfers are seen as affordable (therefore feasible within 
restrictive budgets), and relatively simple development programmes, or ‘Southern Alternatives 
to Development’ (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010).  
Neoliberalism’s legacies, economic growth and the use of cash transfers 
 There are debates relating the growth of social protection and cash transfers to their 
utility in economic growth strategies. Cash transfers, in these debates, are seen as ‘investments’ 
in vulnerable populations that will create economic stability, against the shocks of natural 
disasters or catastrophes such as droughts. Ferguson (2015) point out that there are debates on 
whether cash transfers are neoliberal tools for equipping individuals with assets or investments 
to enable their own growth, instead of relying on the state for welfare and means of 
development. This research suggests a different relationship to neoliberalism. Cash transfers in 
many places in the Global South have been state-led responses to the negative consequences of 
structural adjustment and other neoliberal activity. In support of a different relationship 
between neoliberalism influencing the start of cash transfers (and not cash transfers being a 
neoliberal tool), Devereux (2013, p. 18) links neoliberalism’s production of economic growth for 
a minority group, alongside chronic poverty for the majority, to the creation of a cash transfer or  
social grant to the poor masses as compensation. It is also suggested that while cash transfers 
replaced food aid, they are criticized for underwriting neoliberal policy (Devereux 2013).  
 The case of Mozambican, and as mentioned above, Latin American cash transfers too, 
add to debates on cash transfers starting during and because of the backlash of neoliberalism. 
Directly related to Devereux’s (2013) point on cash transfers being compensation for the 
widening inequality created by neoliberalism, Mozambique is a great example of this. Inequal ity 
has grown in the country since the end of the civil war in 1992. During this period, the transition 
from socialism to a capitalist, democratic system has also meant that there has been a growth in 
an elite faction within the upper class and Frelimo political party (Sumich 2007). While poverty 
levels are said to have reduced from the late 1990s to today, inequality has grown because of 
neoliberalism’s privatization efforts allowing elite groups to grow richer and taking away the 
socialist promotion of equality and distribution. At this same time as an elite has grown in 
Teresa N. Le- 441288 MA, Development Studies Research Report 2016 
 
76 
 
Mozambique, to support Devereux’s (2013) point, cash transfers have grown in coverage and 
spread to compensate for growing inequality levels.  
The economic growth rationale for cash transfers, as investments in human capital, also 
can be supported by evidence in Mozambique. It was suggested in interviews with Antunes 
(2015), De Rooij (2015), and Greany (2015) that the development community motivation for 
cash transfers is of ‘investments’ in people rather than unproductive ‘hand outs’. Evidence for 
this come from Hanlon (2004) when noting that two of Mozambique’s short-term cash transfer 
programmes, targeted at soldier demobilisation from 1992-1996 and flood victims in 2000, had 
positive evaluations of most recipients using their cash transfers to invest in labour-producing 
assets such as farm tools. What is significant to note about the case of Mozambique is that whi le 
it supports the ‘investment’ mentality linked to cash transfers argument, this ideology started 
before the 2000s, and during the time when there was still skepticism around cash transfer 
utility (Schubert 2015).  
As mentioned in chapter two, GAPVU was part of a parcel of offerings to vulnerable and 
displaced persons right before and through the end of the war, during the war-time 
reconstruction phase too. These programmes, such as cash-for-work programmes and cash 
transfer programmes, invested cash interventions in vulnerable groups to allow them to work 
again and return home (Schubert 1992). The evidence for these programmes being seen as 
‘investments’ in economic growth and human capabilities was seen in the ending of these 
programmes five years after the war, so that the intention of human asset-building would be 
achieved and dependency would not ensue (Salomao 2015). As discussed, GAPVU was 
repackaged and continued as the PSA after the Office was closed, because of positive results of 
productive use of the cash transfers with a focus on beneficiaries not able to work. Therefore, 
investment in people unable to work became a focus, using the cash transfer as a replacement 
for work capabilities. Or, they could have been continued because of political motivations of 
elites to appease populations because of neoliberalism creating more dependency on aid and 
sustaining inequality through liberalisation.  
4.ii.b. Typical cash transfer debates challenged by the case of Mozambique 
In contrast to the above section, the case of Mozambique’s cash transfers and social 
protection trajectory is exceptional to other histories of cash transfer development. While 
chapters two and three point out many ways in which this case differs from other cash transfer 
histories, this next section will elaborate on debates of cash transfer development in relation to 
stages of economic development and challenge the notion of welfare as a ‘luxury’ for citizens.  
The luxury and timing of state-sponsored welfare 
On a macro-level, there are debates supporting that welfare-first development is a 
means to spur economic development and that human development and social protection 
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programmes are important prerequisites to enable growth (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 
2010). This argument in favour of the reconstruction of a welfare state as a ‘safer bet’ for 
development over capital accumulation and labour outputs has recently gained traction in the 
Global South (Arrighi, Aschoff and Scully, cited in Evans 2010, p. 41; Evans 2010, p. 38-40). The 
rise in social protection programmes and welfare-first development in the Global South has 
come as a surprise, however, since historically countries in the Western hemisphere only 
adopted social assistance via cash transfers post-industrialization. This is because they were seen 
as a social luxury and because states felt the need to be at a certain economic level before being 
able to fund welfare (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010).  
In this sense, Mozambique is an exceptional example of a low-income, pre-industria l i sed 
country that adopted social welfare and social protection practices before reaching this state of 
development. This early adoption can be attributed to Mozambique’s Marxist-Leninist political 
ideology that promoted equality through a means of social assistance, even when state budgets 
barely had flexibility for these programmes. Even a poor, war-ridden country heavily constrained 
financially under structural adjustment programmes and weak economic development was able 
to promote welfare of their most vulnerable citizens at an unexpected time. It has been said that 
the Ministry of Finance came up with crafty ways of initially funding these programmes (through 
food auction profit savings) and focused on keeping their administrative costs low because of 
budget constraints (Schubert 2015). Lack of financial resources has never been motivation for 
the Mozambican state to stop supporting these programmes, and they have even taken 
measures to request World Bank funding to maintain and expand the programmes. Therefore, 
this financial inventiveness of the Ministry of Finance allowed Mozambique to start a cash 
transfer programme, despite having a weak national expenditure and not being at an advanced 
stage of economic development.  Social protection programmes have been praised globally as 
relatedly low-cost development programmes, and this is perhaps why they have spread in the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa too, despite industrialisation lagging in these places. 
 These debates on timing of social cash transfers within a certain period of a country’s 
economic status relate to the ability for states to sustainably fund these programmes. 
Mozambique has never been a middle-income country, even despite consistent ‘high’ rates of 
economic growth, but the state has always been the majority contributor to social protection. As 
noted by Garcia and Moore (2012), their ‘typologies of cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
imply that long-term, government funded programmes mostly only occur in middle-income 
countries. This is in contrast to low-income, fragile states implementing short-term, externally 
supported intervention programmes. Government funding in Mozambique has not only 
impacted the longevity of the social cash transfer programmes, but also the relationship that the 
programme has with external donors and external technical assistants. What came through in 
the interview process was a clear depiction of government ownership of social cash transfer 
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programmes in Mozambique, however, this is unique to the sector as donors have completely 
saturated other social services such as healthcare and education (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015) . 
From the side of the donor community and civil society, there was also a notion of respect for 
this government ownership in allowing these programmes to thrive (Chivambo 2015; De Rooij 
2015).  
 Garcia and Moore (2012) note that one of the issues that helps programmes survive is 
clear government ownership and impetus towards social cash transfers by creating an enabling 
environment for policy, or through ministerial support. In the case of Mozambique, the clear 
government role in cash transfer programmes could have also attributed towards a partnership-
style collaborative environment for donors to work together (Antunes 2015; De Rooij 2015). 
With clear government leadership, donors do not have to fight over who will manage or 
implement these programmes, and donors can work around what government has put in place, 
including working with the implementing institution, INAS. Thus, despite its low-income status, 
the case of Mozambique shows that welfare is no longer a luxury but a necessary investment in 
vulnerable people.  
Mozambique’s adoption of social cash transfers and overall promotion of social policy 
and welfare was unique for the stage of economic development that the country was in, but also 
was unique for the time period that they began on the African continent. As addressed above, 
Mozambique did follow the pattern of adopting cash transfers in a time of conflict and instabili ty 
(Garcia and Moore 2012). In addition, after a period of economic decline caused by high 
inflation, the early 1990s time period in which Mozambique enacted its cash transfers is 
completely exceptional for Sub-Saharan Africa, although was similar to the case of Latin America 
(Lavinas 2013). In comparison to the other countries on the African continent, 31 out of a survey 
of 40 of Africa’s total 123 social cash transfer programmes started after year 2000, with 50% of 
all cash transfer programmes starting within the last ten years (Garcia and Moore 2012, p. 49). 
Thus, while cash transfers for poverty alleviation were not completely novel programmes, in the 
context of a fragile state such as Mozambique, cash transfers were called an ‘unconventional’ 
social policy starting well over one to two decades before most African programmes.  
The histories of Mozambique and Latin America presented in this section are unique, 
because as Devereux (2002, p. 661) pointed out, “the late 1990s saw a growing disillusionment 
with social safety nets, which were criticized as welfarist mechanisms that reduced the poor to 
passive recipients of handouts and made little contribution to broader development goals or to 
sustainable poverty reduction.” Although GAPVU was officially closed in the late 1990s, previous 
chapters have addressed that this was more for administrative purposes. It was closed in order 
to reshape the programme by giving it its own autonomous implementing institution (INAS), 
make the transfers more effective by creating new targeting that recognized different socio-
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economic requirements, and expand their coverage to rural areas (Alane 2015; Massingharela 
and Nhate 2006, p. 18). These are clearly signs of government support and intention to expand 
these welfare mechanisms during a period of time when these programmes were not popular 
and saw a growing ‘disillusionment’. Furthermore, Latin America and Mozambique actually are 
exceptional cash transfer histories with significant scale during the late 1990s, too: a time when 
these programmes were not favorable yet they grew because of local evidence of their 
importance and successes in the ten years prior. 
Lavers and Hickey (2015, p. 16) suggest that timing is essential for social protection 
adoption, whereby in times of stability, external actors have little opportunity to influence states 
and decision makers regarding their political settlements. Instead, external actors must capitalize 
on moments of crisis or uncertainty when elites are re-negotiating the terms of the political 
settlement with citizens (Hickey 2009 cited in Lavers and Hickey 2015, p. 16). Fernandes (2015), 
of the World Bank in Mozambique, adds to this debate when pointing out how in the context of 
poverty and vulnerability, social protection is very similar everywhere, even when countries are 
at different stages of development. Fernandes (2015) asserts that social protection always takes 
a hit in times of crises, which turns into a ‘vicious’ cycle because that is when these programmes 
are needed the most. While Fernandes’ (2015) point can resonate with discussions on social 
protection and their links to health, education and labour markets across countries, the case of 
Mozambique challenges part of her claims that these programmes take a hit in times of crises, as 
we saw that social protection in Mozambique were born and strengthened during times of 
crises—from the civil war, to the food riots.   
4.iii. Conclusion: GAPVU exceptionalism as a pioneer 
 It has been addressed that Mozambique’s cash transfers have had a unique inception on 
the African continent, and can relate closely to the cases of cash transfer development in Latin 
America. The case of Mozambique is exceptional on the African continent, too, because there 
were zero programmes of similar nature (non-pension) to learn from when it started (Schubert 
2015). Massinghela and Nhate (2006, p. 17) take this further when pointing out that generally 
implementation of any sort of development programme in Africa is a result of successful 
implementation in other neighboring countries, and through donor support. It is evident that the 
Government did not have any other examples to learn from, and this caused management set-
backs and suspected high levels of corruption in its first five years. The important aspect to take 
away is that the Mozambican state started these programmes without other pioneer examples, 
and as a result has kept these programmes close to home and within government control for 
longer periods of time than most other programmes.  
Schubert (2015) mentioned that even though Mozambique did not have other examples 
of social cash transfer programmes to learn from, at the demand of low cost and war conditions, 
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the motivation for GAPVU came from personalities within Government who were willing to think 
outside of the box, and not employ the mainstream modes of poverty reduction such as 
ineffective food aid. Thus, the ‘political’ ingenuity to utilise the programmes for political support 
is positively exemplified in the case of Mozambique, and this was not a strategy adopted from 
examples of any other countries, as there did not exist such examples at the time. Perhaps 
Frelimo’s employment of GAPVU could be one of the first usages and replications during the 
food riots of social cash transfers for political motivations and deepening social rapport with 
political settlements, especially during times of increased political and social vulnerability.  
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5. Chapter five: Conclusion 
5.i. The significance of the case of Mozambique 
 What is the significance of Mozambique’s long history of cash transfers, as mentioned, 
being the fourth oldest programme and first non-contributory cash transfer scheme from a low-
income country? Mozambique’s main programme, unlike many early programmes in Southern 
Africa, is not a contribution-based pension scheme, but an unconditional cash transfer targeted 
at different vulnerable groups. In addition, most social protection programmes on the African 
continent have either been recent developments of the last ten years, or have been 
implemented through the wide use of external support and funding (Garcia and Moore 2012). 
The historical significance of the case of Mozambique’s social cash transfers is not only because 
it is often not discussed in social protection literature (Ferguson 2015; Garcia and Moore 2012). 
The significance is brought forth by Mkandawire (2010, p.41), when stating: 
“The history of poverty, especially its on-and-off appearances on national and international 
agendas, has been one of the central preoccupations of modern social science. However, the 
current discourse on poverty seems totally oblivious to the earlier appearances of poverty on the 
social agenda, and thus rarely bothers to ask why things have not worked.” 
The process of tracing Mozambique’s social cash transfer history required digging into 
the political framings of poverty, social development, and redistribution from the viewpoint of 
Frelimo. This history, as outlined in chapter two, explained why the Government was motivated 
to create a social cash transfer programme when they had little means nor technical capability of 
doing so. In addition, tracing the history of SAPs and the civil war, the conditions under which 
GAPVU was created, draws strong links between social cash transfer interventions for political 
use, in addition to its use in addressing rising inequality, inflation and vulnerability. This 
concluding section will touch on how the case of Mozambique can contribute to larger 
discussions on state autonomy carried out during neoliberalism confines, development in 
Mozambique, and the significance of the case of cash transfers at this specific point in 
Mozambican history. 
5.i.a.  State autonomy during neoliberalism 
It has been addressed that scholars are no longer focused on neoliberalism’s anti-statist 
agenda, but have focused on the ways that neoliberal activity relied on the state to create 
institutions and policy for economic liberalization and privatization to occur (De Renzio and 
Hanlon 2007; Jinadu 2010; Weiss 2010). The same has not been done for neoliberalism and 
social sector activity, however, which also took huge hits from budget switching activity and the 
roll-back of state involvement in social services. It is generally implied that a result of the 
neoliberal era and a facet of the post-independence period of Africa is that foreign institutions 
and NGOs played and still play an increasing role in development and social service provision 
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(O’Laughlin 1996). In fact, the link between the rise of donor-dependency and neoliberalism’s 
attempt to ‘privatise’ the development and social sectors has not been addressed as much, 
although there is ample evidence. Take the example of ‘development darlings’ such as 
Mozambique, who not only welcomed in market liberalisation which resulted in economic 
growth, but who also became increasingly aid development over the same period of time (De 
Renzio and Hanlon 2007).  
It is worth analyzing GAPVU as a case because as mentioned earlier, neoliberalism had the 
effect of ‘being blind’ to social policy and social  protection in general (Ferguson 2009). The 
importance of highlighting where social protection and social policy occurred in relation to 
neoliberalism is that these examples highlight the relationship that neoliberalism, its 
programmes, such as SAPs had in catalyzing the growth of government interventions in social 
services. The case that is discussed here is of social cash transfers, which was a direct response 
of the Government to the inequality that increased because of the conditions of neoliberalism 
and because of the war, which as stated was ignored when SAPs was adopted. In addition, the 
same could be viewed of the 2008 and 2010 food riots, whereby rises in inequality and hikes in 
food prices were seen not only in Mozambique but in other places around the world. While 
neoliberalism might not be the direct catalyst of these food riots, globalisation and the impact of 
global volatility in food prices were also felt in Mozambique. Therefore, this case urges further 
analysis of neoliberalism and the role of the state in social services, because social services and 
development are areas that still widely feel the impacts of neoliberalism and privatization.  
In terms of social policy history, Mkandawire (2010) notes that the 1960s-1970s anti-
poverty initiatives in Africa widely failed due to a lack of social policy framework. This was 
because of the prioritization of the ‘nation-state’ project in many African states, that was not 
coupled with efforts towards welfare development. As noted in chapter two, however, 
Mozambique’s history with their nationalist project did attempt to incorporate social welfare 
through the message of equity and distribution. These comments by Mkandawire (2010) are 
important because these ‘failures’ of the 1960s and 1970s, which Waterhouse and Lauriciano 
(2009) closely link to the ‘failures’ of the Mozambican socialist project of the 1970s and early 
1980s, would have suggested that the Mozambican government would not have tried to engage 
with social policy in the early 1990s. Waterhouse and Lauriciano (2009) attribute these failures 
to why Mozambique did not have a social protection policy until 2009. This research argues 
against these claims, and provides evidence that despite failures on the front of the nationalist 
social project, failures of social policy in post-independence Africa, and despite the welcoming of 
neoliberalism and World Bank poverty agendas, the Mozambican state still played and still  pl ays 
an instrumental role in state-sponsored social protection.  
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5.i.a. Mozambican development discourse 
Development discourse is where examples, however small, such as Mozambique’s social 
cash transfers, can have significant impact. The social protection sector in Mozambique is unique 
because, unlike health and education, interviewees noted that there are only four main actors in 
the social protection sector versus 40 in each health and education (De Rooij 2015; Greany 
2015). Versus social protection, where donors ‘get along’ and work within the programmes and 
frameworks created by the Government’s autonomous implementing institution, INAS, it was 
noted that health and education are so saturated with donors that programmes cannot move 
forward and decision-making is a difficult task (De Rooij 2015). Health and education, as 
presented earlier, have a unique history in Mozambique because they were the two sectors that 
fell under Frelimo’s nationalization project. One particular result of these nationalization efforts 
was that Maputo in 1992 had a better vaccination rate than New York City and London, and the 
health sector under Marxist-Leninist Frelimo was quite strong (Flederman 1993; Salomao 2015). 
This is not the case today, and as presented in chapter two, health facilities and schools outside 
of the capital city became targeted by Renamo during civil war combat (Hanlon 1996). In 
addition, under SAPs, state budgets for education and hiring of medical professionals were 
severely cut. This is an issue that President Guebuza also faced up until 2005, when trying to hire 
10,000 new teachers and being blocked by the BWIs in doing so (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007). 
Health and education contrast widely to the social protection in Mozambique, and those sectors 
can be analysed as successful in terms of privatization, yet, unsuccessful because of the weak 
role the Government has over those sectors because of neoliberal achievements.  
While critiquing the World Bank’s SDA Programme, Marshall (1990, p. 41) commented 
that “one of the most troubling dimensions of the economic recovery programme is 
Mozambique’s dramatic dependency on foreign donors. Control has shifted out of Mozambican 
hands in an alarming fashion. Economic policy has come to rest very much with the IMF/World 
Bank, with bilateral donors lining up behind it.” While this comment was made in 1990, the 
continual rise of foreign aid in Mozambique and views on Mozambique’s aid ‘dependence’ 
spread throughout the 1990s, 2000s and this view is still regarded today (De Renzio and Hanlon 
2007). The dichotomy of ‘BWIs and donors’ versus the ‘Mozambican State’ at odds with each 
other is one that has remained in the development discourse of Mozambique since the post-
independence period.  
This research has attempted to challenge this dichotomy, and whether it is necessary to 
try to seek out cases of non-state autonomy (and therefore donor-led, neoliberal influence) or 
state-autonomy present. Whereby donor influence has impacted the pressure of budget 
allocation increases and pressure to expand coverage of social cash transfers, donors only 
started playing a significant role in cash transfer programmes starting in the mid-2000s. In 
addition, this research has brought forth that within the development community, there is a 
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level of respect from donors for the Mozambican Government, and its ownership over its 
internally incepted social cash transfer programme. What is significant to take away from the 
case of GAPVU and the social cash transfer programmes today is that perceptions on the 
Mozambican Government’s ‘donor-led development’ can be challenged. GAPVU is a case that 
falls outside of the notion of high levels of aid, and very weak Government ‘owned’ or created 
development strategies at the hands of donors. This dominant notion regarding development in 
Mozambique usually results in a negative answer of whether ‘Mozambique has had 
development’ (De Renzio and Hanlon 2007; Hanlon and Smart 2008).  
This is not necessarily the question that should be asked today. Similar to how the 
question of the state’s existence during neoliberalism has evolved from ‘how much state’ to 
‘what kind of state’ from Evans (1995), the question today should be, ‘what kind of 
development’ instead of ‘how much’. Therefore, it is appropriate to acknowledge these small 
cases of state-led development, because long-term cases like GAPVU create dynamics where the 
Government is able to command where they want donor assistance.  For example, will the 
Government choose to request World Bank funding for specific programmes? Or when they 
want to maintain control over their programmes, will the Government continue to decrease 
donor funding directly to cash transfers? This image of authoritative, well-respected 
Government institutions, such as INAS and the Ministry of Finance, taking leadership on a 
development programme for the last twenty years is not the image that is typically given off 
when people think of development in Mozambique. In addition, the ‘kind’ of development that 
Mozambique seems to desire is not one that is completely owned by donors, versus completely 
owned by the state; it is cooperative and complementary.  
In his interview, Dr. Salomao (2015), who has been a civil servant and member of Frel imo 
for over 30 years, implied that the Government of Mozambique has understood that it needs the 
assistance from IFIs in order to achieve growth. In the same light, the Government knows how to 
be very strategic about how accepting donor conditions, and how to keep them within the 
parameters of the Government’s own vision. While this ‘position’ on government-donor 
relations has played out differently in various sectors of Mozambique, whereby certain sectors 
have been dominated by donors or private companies, the case of cash transfers is a good 
example of the Government being able to draw boundaries and maintain its autonomy over this 
programme. The role of the Mozambican state is clearly recognized in social protection 
development circles, and this is different from the state’s role in general discussions on 
Mozambican development, as addressed above. While the Government might have ‘failed’ 
against the liberalisation of health and education due to neoliberalism state-roll back and budget 
cuts, social protection and the work of cash transfers is one, even small, area that the 
government has maintained its central position and desire to stay autonomous despite attempts 
to confine its role.  Perhaps out of desperation because of high rates of poverty and growing 
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inequality from the civil war and structural adjustment, it can be observed that the Government 
strategically formed links with the BWIs in order to receive much needed donor assistance but in 
order to dictate how that assistance would play out. As remarked by Dr. Salomao (2015), this 
does not mean that the Government lost interest in its own provision of welfare and social 
protection for citizens, which today only grows in numbers. 
5.ii. Concluding remarks  
This research comes at an interesting time when some of the dynamics that were present 
when GAPVU was started are appearing again. Mozambique today is once again faced with 
conditions of rising inequality, high inflation rates, as well as brewing political  and social 
instability between Renamo and Frelimo, just when the country is about to celebrate 25 years 
since the end of the previous civil war. Arguments presented here highlight that one of the 
rationales for the Government’s adoption of social cash transfers was as a political solidarity 
move, through providing a cash transfer to aid vulnerable, and potentially oppositional 
populations. What will be interesting to see in the coming months and years is whether social 
cash transfers are once again called upon as a political tool to appeal to masses, and potential ly 
appease conflict. While the Government is already on a mission to increase budget a llocation 
and outreach of its social cash transfer programmes in line with its strategy of the last decade, 
will these programmes receive additional attention and funding because of the political and 
social climate of Mozambique? 
In addition, the development community in Mozambique is still deeply aid entrenched 
and one can still ask if the Government is ‘dependent’ on aid. But within these realities, similar to 
the past, the Government still works to maintain hold of its autonomy an authority through 
implementing social cash transfers and giving their own money directly into the hands of their 
own people. And perhaps similar to the notion of a ‘Southern Alternative to Development’, the 
Government of Mozambique chooses unconditional cash transfers, and chooses to receive 
relatively low amounts of funding from donors for them, as a way to allow citizens a level of 
autonomy, too. This research has addressed how cash transfers have risen to replace food 
subsidies and other forms of in-kind development assistance, because they equip people with 
the capability to make their own decisions over how money will be spent. The results, especially 
in Mozambique, have been a productive use of cash transfers as investments in assets, 
education, or day-to-day commodities. On a symbolic level, perhaps the Mozambican 
Government is so supportive of unconditional cash transfers because from the State’s 
perspective, Mozambique does not want donors to keep telling them how to spend their money, 
such as through tied aid, funding of their development programmes, and so forth. Cash transfers 
in Mozambique are not only an expression of state autonomy, but a state-sponsored opportunity 
for individual autonomy.  
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7. Appendices 
7.i. Interview contacts 
Organization Contact Position Meeting set up 
Wits School of 
Governance A. van den Heever Professor 7/14/2015 
Embassy of 
Netherlands Eleasara Antunes Gender, Social Protection, HIV Director 7/30/2015 
UNICEF Karin de Rooij  Social Protection Specialist 8/4/2015 
DFID Kate Greany 
Social Development Adviser; Lead Adviser on 
Social Protection 8/5/2015 
World Bank Moz Rita Fernandes Social Protection Specialist (Consultant) 8/14/2015 
PSC-PS Genifer Chivambo Communications Officer 8/20/2015 
Kaleidoscopio 
Group led by Euclides 
Goncalves and Benedito 
Machava 
Director of Kaleidoscopio and History Lecturer at 
Universidad Eduardo Mondlane 8/21/2015 
Frelimo Tomaz Salomao 
Former Minister of Planning and Finance, 1994-
1999; Former Secretary of SADC 8/25/2015 
MMAS Ivete Alane 
Permanent Secretary for Ministry of Sport and 
Youth; Former Permanent Secretary at MMAS 8/26/2015 
GTZ/Consultant Dr. Bernd Schubert Consultant to GAPVU 8/27/2015 
IMF Rita Neves 
 
contacted 
INAS Olivia Faite 
 
contacted 
MMAS Miguel Mausse 
 
contacted 
MMAS/INAS Elsa Alfai  Adviser and Former Director contacted 
OPM Luca Pellerano 
 
contacted 
Wits School of 
Governance Horatio Zandemela Professor contacted 
World Food 
Programme Marta Guivambo 
 
contacted 
FES Manon Dietrich-Rossini  
 
contacted 
IESE Antonio Francisco 
 
contacted 
Consultant/DFID Rachel Waterhouse Human Development Team Leader contacted 
INAS 
Lúcia Bernadete 
Nairroce/Mairosse Director of INAS contacted  
ILO Nuno Cunha 
 
contacted- end 
Aug 
ILO Ruben Vicente 
 
out of town until  
8/31 
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7.ii. Sample interview guidelines (English and Portuguese) 
Personal Involvement in the Social Protection Sector 
-What is your position at your organisation? How long have you worked there?  
Qual é a sua posição na sua organização? Quanto tempo você trabalhou lá? 
 
-How did you get involved in this work? 
-Como foi que você se envolveu neste trabalho?  
Process of Social Protection Development in Mozambique 
-Who started the first cash transfer programme? When? 
Quem iniciou o primeiro programa de transferência em dinheiro/programa da proteção 
social? Quando? 
 
-Why was it created? Was it in response to anything? 
-Por que ele foi criado? Foi em resposta a alguma coisa?  
 
-What are motivations for growing the social protection sector? 
Quais são as motivações para o crescente sector da proteção social?  
 
-What were major milestones in its growth? By who/From who? 
Quais foram as principais etapas de seu crescimento? Por quem/De quem? 
Roles in Social Protection 
-Who are the key actors involved in the social protection sector today? 
Quem são os principais actores envolvidos no sector da proteção social hoje em dia? 
 
-Who are the main supporters of cash transfers: 
a. Politically  
b. Financially 
C. Socially 
 
-Quem são os principais apoiantes da proteção social:  
a. Politicamente 
b. Financeiramente  
c. Socialmente 
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Views on Social Protection and Cash Transfers 
-How have views on social protection and cash transfers evolved politically and socially, 
and by different sectors? 
Como é que opiniões sobre a proteção social e as transferências de dinheiro evoluíram 
politicamente e socialmente, e por diferentes setores? 
 
-What is your view on the state’s ability and/or responsibility to provide welfare to its 
citizens? 
Qual é a sua opinião sobre a capacidade e ou da capacidade do estado de proporcionar 
o bem-estar aos seus cidadãos? 
 
-Does the state have an interest in growing cash transfer programmes? 
o estado tem interesse em aumentar programas de transferência de renda? 
 
-What is the utility of cash transfer programmes to the government? 
Qual é a utilidade dos programas de transferência de renda para o governo? 
 
 
-What are challenges to government’s implementation of cash transfer programmes, 
historically and today?  
Quais são os desafios para o governo na implementação de programas de transferência 
de renda, historicamente e hoje? 
 
-Do donors or external partners create challenges for government’s ability to carry out 
cash transfer programmes?  
Os doadores ou parceiros externos criam desafios na de execução capacidade do 
governo nos   programas de transferência de renda? 
 
